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Full Length Research Paper

Brazil's African policy and the experience of the first Lula government (2003 to 2006)

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This article aims to analyze Brazil-Africa relations in the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva government (2003 to 2006). The hypothesis supported is that Brazil-Africa relations can be characterized as a varying intensity process, declining sharply in the 1980 to 1990 period and gaining momentum from 2003 to 2006. Structurally, the text is organized as follows: In the first section, a brief characterization of Brazil's African policy was conducted by identifying its origins, goals and constraints. Next, the Lula administration's foreign policy was focused on. The third topic centers its attention on Brazil-Africa trade relations during the same administration. In the final considerations, the main aspects developed in the text are reviewed.

Key words: Brasil, Africa, Lula government.

INTRODUCTION

This article aims to analyze Brazil-Africa relations in the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva government (2003-2006). The hypothesis supported is that Brazil-Africa relations can be characterized as a varying intensity process, declining sharply in the 1980–1990 period and gaining momentum from 2003 to 2006. Structurally, the text is organized as follows: In the first section, we conduct a brief characterization of Brazil's African policy, by identifying its origins, goals and constraints. Next, we focus on the Lula administration's foreign policy. The third topic centers its attention on Brazil–Africa trade relations during the same administration. In the final considerations, the main aspects developed in the text are reviewed.

METHODOLOGY

The article aims to assess the changes occurred in the Brazilian

foreign policy for Africa building on the methodology proposed by Hermann (1990). As described in Table 1, Hermann considers that changes in the course of a State's foreign policy can be classified in four levels. As this study seeks to show, over the period under analysis the actions of the Brazilian foreign office towards Africa fit into a process of change as described in the first level: Brazil's relations towards Africa are characterized by adjustments in the foreign policy traditionally developed by the Itamaraty in relation to that continent, in that changes in the guidelines adopted do not necessarily occur. In this process, changes that took place and were set in place in the international setting of the late 1980s are consolidated in the following decade and necessarily lead to redirecting the Brazilian diplomatic action vis-à-vis the international system and the African continent in particular

BRAZIL'S AFRICAN POLICY: ORIGINS, GOALS, AND CONSTRAINTS

Despite the fact that Brazil has the world's second largest

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Table 1. Foreign policy: Levels of change and characteristics.

Degrees of change	Characteristics
Adjustment changes	Characterized by adjustments in the foreign policy in place, with no changes in the guidelines adopted
Program changes	Characterized by changes in the methods and means used for the achievement of goals that lead to changes of a qualitative nature by broadening the role of negotiation through diplomacy rather than for example, the use of military force
Problem/goal changes	Concerns a change in the foreign policy goals themselves that leads to a redefining of the goals and the setting in place of new foreign policy goals and guidelines;
International orientation changes	Regards a type of much deeper change, entailing not only the redirecting of the actor's orientation in international relations, but also of the international system and its own positioning.

Source: Based on Herman (1990).

black population, the perception that Africa could represent a privileged dimension for Brazilian foreign policy emblematically only emerges in the 1960s,ⁱ in the context of the Independent Foreign Policy, launched by the Jânio Quadros (1961) government. This notion appears and gains momentum supported by the academic debates that were already taking place at the time of the Juscelino Kubitschek administration, championed by intellectuals such as Gilberto Freyre, who advocated the constitution of a Lusitanian-tropical community in the Atlantic space.ⁱⁱ In that period, however, the ratification by Brazil of the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation eclipsed the African theme and relegated it to the Portuguese sphere. Thus, throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the dimension of Africa's potentialities was progressively and substantially incorporated into the Brazilian foreign policy. Drawing on a third-worldist rhetoric, initially it sought to counterbalance the weight exerted by its relations with the U.S. and oppose the constraints imposed by the Cold War's East-West cleavage. In the midst of a process of decolonization that was taking place in the African-Asian world, Brazil identified in Africa the possibility of diplomatic arrangements capable of enabling it to position itself distinctly in the international scene.ⁱⁱⁱ

Brazil's action towards Africa and the country's solidarity policy towards the peoples of the Third World, in the early 1960s, are directly associated with the leadership role Brazil claimed in the international sphere. They are part of a set of actions (establishment of diplomatic and trade relations with the socialist countries of Asia and Europe, particularly the USSR) which pursued a revision of the country's relations with the USA and its hegemonic power. The initiatives for Africa constitute elements that mark the start of an indeed African policy in Brazil. It was devised and planned in the context of the diplomatic corps, highly insulated, in the Brazilian case,^{iv} based on a consistent blueprint and strategic calculations; an important chapter in the Brazilian quest for new international political and economic partners and, at the same time, a space for the conquest of greater autonomy within the framework of the international relations of the time.^v

From this point of view, Brazil's African policy and the universalistic behavior of its diplomacy, in which value is placed on the establishment of non-excluding partnerships aimed at promoting its own autonomy. In this period, however, the preponderance of Brazil's special relations with Portugal hindered the implementation of a policy that effectively supported the African territories in their process of independence. The Brazilian posture of supporting Portugal in those matters regarding the Portuguese colonies was still pegged to a rhetoric of traditional ties of friendship, based on its condition of former colony and on the Lusitanian cultural heritage.^{vi}

It was only in the 1970s, with the Carnation Revolution (1974) and the independence of the Portuguese colonies (1974-1975), that Brazil's actions towards Africa began to evolve more substantially in favor of the autonomy of the new States and the consolidation of friendly and equitable relations of the former with Lisbon.^{vii} From that decade on, Portugal launches a process aiming at redefining its role in international relations, and shifts from its relative international isolation towards integration with the European Economic Community, a process that materializes in 1985.^{viii}

In this period, under the military governments of Emílio Garrastazu Médice (1969-1974), Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) and João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo (1979-1985), Brazil's relations with the Portuguese colonies in Africa are substantially deepened. By means of the so-called responsible pragmatism policy, Brazil becomes a privileged partner of African countries, mainly of Nigeria (from which the country purchased oil), countries of Southern Africa and the former Portuguese colonies.^{ix}

Relying on the presence of Brazilian corporations, (both public and private) such as Petrobras, through its subsidiary Braspetro, and construction contractor Norberto Odebrecht^x, which operated in the continent, trade exchange reveals a definitely positive performance both in the interest of African buyers of Brazilian products and that of Brazilian importers of African goods, so much so that, in 1974, Brazilian exports grow by 129.1% year-on-year, from US\$ 190,001,000 to US\$ 435,323,000.

Over the same period, imports from the African continent record a dramatic growth of 300.2%, advancing from US\$ 169,903,000 to US\$ 679,998,000.^{xi} Yet with the José Sarney administration (1985-1990), changes at home and abroad negatively impact Brazil-Africa relations. Starting in that period, Brazil begins to experience a critical phase, one in which the country's strategies of action at the international level prove obsolete, as the foreign policy model associated with "national development" gives place to a phase of crisis and contradictions.^{xii} In this context, the policy towards the African continent is severely undermined by the demise of third-worldist principles and by the economic crisis affecting with different, albeit equally negative intensities, both sides of the Atlantic.

In the early 1990s, Brazil-Africa relations are marked by a process of adjustments, in which we witness a clear loss of importance of the African partners in the country's international positioning. Economic and political factors alike contribute to this process. With regard to the former factor, we may point out the international economic crisis, which affects the developing countries, particularly Sub-Saharan African States, and the adverse domestic economic situation. With reference to the political sphere, it is the transformations in the international order and a clear loss of coordination capacity by the developing countries, in addition to the tenets guiding the Brazilian diplomacy with regard to South-South relations.

The lesser commercial importance of the African countries did not completely eliminate Brazil's foreign policy for that continent. If economic and commercial expectations were frustrated, the same cannot be said of the place occupied by the PALOP (African Countries of Portuguese as Official Language) and by the South Atlantic in the Brazilian diplomacy. The setting up of the International Portuguese Language Institute (IILP), in 1989, and of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP)^{xiii}, should be viewed as resulting from initiatives by the Brazilian government, which, in 1999, hosts the first summit of Heads of State of the Portuguese Language Countries. As for the South Atlantic, with the establishment of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS)^{xiv}, the region begins to represent a singular space for projecting Brazilian diplomacy, a geopolitical context in which Brazil is clearly capable of acting as a protagonist among and a mediator between the countries of South America and those of the Sub-Saharan Africa washed by the ocean.

At any rate, the overall tally of Brazil-Africa relations in the post-Cold War indicates that they were assigned a dimension of smaller relevance in the country's international positioning strategy, especially when compared to the military regime period. Yet this phenomenon cannot simply be explained by a change of the political regime or the rationale of trade relations, but rather by Brazil's own difficulty in reading and responding to the foreign constraints that pushed the country and, with greater speed and intensity, the African continent, to a marginal situation in the international environment.

The adjustments made to the Brazilian foreign policy towards the African continent denote, thus, a shift in Brazilian diplomacy as a response to the international context of the 1980s and 1990s, marked by the polarization established by the US and the USSR and by the imposition of an international system of an unpredictable transitory character. For Brazil, this period reflects the country's new posture with respect to its adherence to international regimes and cooperative arrangements,^{xv} in which the foreign policy towards the African continent comes to have a relatively high "cost".

The carrying out of the regionalization process, with the Mercosur, and the economic feebleness observed in Brazil and across the Atlantic, inhibit the Brazilian foreign policy for Africa, which is limited to focusing on developing preferential relations with CPLP member countries.^{xvi} A reduction in diplomats,^{xvii} the continuous decline in trade relations^{xviii} and a concentration of relations with the PALOP countries^{xix} and with South Africa reveal a general tendency of declining trade relations, which becomes much more clear-cut with the decision, during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration's two terms of office (1995-1998 and 1999-2002), of closing diplomatic posts in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), Yaoundé (Cameroon), Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Lomé (Togo) and Lusaka (Zambia); a process that indeed limited the capacity of Brazil's foreign policy to leverage strategic objectives of a political and economic nature in Africa.

In such a context, it is perceptible that the Brazilian diplomacy underwent a phase of redefining its priorities, with its South American neighbors regaining a priority status in Brazil's foreign agenda. Thereafter, the Brazilian diplomacy endeavors to: (a) Modernize and align the country's foreign agenda with the international moment; (b) Redefine relations with the United States, by overcoming the contentions then existent, and; (c) Rid the Brazilian foreign policy from its third-worldist character (Hirst and Pinheiro, 1995).

In the domestic front, the economic stabilization policy and the reform of the Brazilian State exert dramatic influence, prompting the country to promote a trade opening policy that privileges relations with the U.S. and the European Union. In this context, it may be clearly perceived that the decline in Brazil-Africa trades is associated with the role of the State in the economy, characterized by deregulation and widespread privatization. Hence, it must be acknowledged that, with some rare exceptions, Brazil-Africa trade relations were more often than not supported by projects conducted by State agencies, a situation that hampered the promotion of a more robust African policy. Yet the weight of the African continent on the Brazilian diplomatic agenda would be altered with the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to the Presidency of the Republic. As will be analyzed in the next topic, as of 2003, African countries will be worthy of greater Brazilian diplomatic attention and investment.

Brazil's African policy faces, from then on, an inflection

point, with its African partners once again occupying a top position in Brazil's international agenda.

THE LULA GOVERNMENT FOREIGN POLICY: ADJUSTMENTS AND INNOVATIONS

However relevant to the concern expressed by several political and economic sectors (both domestically and overseas), the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to the Presidency of the Republic did not substantially alter the conduction of the Brazilian macroeconomic policy (Paulani, 2003). The Lula government retained the economic benchmarks of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) administration – flexible exchange associated with growing financial liberalization; an inflationary target regime; and the attainment of considerable primary surpluses in public accounts. The official argument for maintaining this “tripod” was that only by supporting the fundamentals of the macroeconomic policy would the government be able to ensure its “credibility” with the financial markets; which would, furthermore, impose the effort of creating structurally stable financing conditions for the public sector, in particular, and by way of constitutional reforms (social security, tax, Central Bank independence, etc.), capable of compressing expenditures and solidifying the aforementioned “tripod” (Prates and Cunha, 2004). Meanwhile, the course of the Brazilian foreign agenda underwent considerable adjustments, particularly in comparison with the FHC government, whose concern and foreign goal was to consolidate relations with the mainstream of the global economy – the United States, Europe and Japan in opposition to the third-worldist tenets. Now with Celso Amorim, reinstated to the office of Foreign Relations Minister, which he had held during the Itamar Franco administration, and with Marco Aurélio Garcia, as Special Advisor to the President of the Republic for International Affairs, the Lula government promoted significant changes in the country's foreign policy. Largely for the fact that such actors were, historically, favorable to Brazil's closer political and commercial relations with all developing countries.

The government's foreign agenda would focus on favoring integration with Argentina and the consolidation of the South-American Community of Nations; promoting exports and harmonizing its interests with those of the G-20 at the WTO; strengthening multilateralism, with the U.N. and its Security Council reform; deepening partnerships with India and South Africa; coming closer to other regions of the developing world, such as Africa, the Arab countries and Central America and the Caribbean, and developing relations with traditional partners (the U.S., Europe and Japan), besides China and Russia (Ribeiro, 2007).

As observed by Lima, such changes are derived from the government's international project, drawing on its vision of the international reordering, namely, that at the

global level there is room for a more affirmative presence of Brazil, which reflects “[...] a certain evaluation of the world context, which assumes the existence of breaches for a middle power like Brazil, which, by means of active and consistent diplomacy, may be enlarged” (de Lima, 2003). Such perception about the international order may be observed in both the Lula government pronouncements and initiatives. Broadly speaking, it is endorsed by the assessment that, despite the military predominance accomplished by the U.S. globally, the economic order still holds more pluralistic possibilities, given the fact that, with the strengthening of the European Union on account of the creation of the euro, there is a subsequent weakening of the dollar. Hence, the existence of a less homogeneous and more competitive world would allow, in the current administration's view, a counter-hegemonic movement, whose axes would rest on an enlarged Europe, with the inclusion of Russia, and on Asia, where powers like China and India may come to represent a counterpoint to the United States in the region. By this perception, unipolarity cannot legitimate itself, for the imperial temptation is permanent, which, simultaneously, stimulates the investment of the remaining powers (de Lima, 2003). From that perspective, the appointment of Ambassador Celso Amorim to the Foreign Relations Ministry constituted a sign that Brazil's foreign policy would not significantly alter its course. Rather, it would seek to review the country's negotiations and the terms of its international partnerships, in an attempt to build alliances outside the hemisphere as a way to enlarge its power of influence in the international arena, by adopting an active agenda and a leading behavior. Thus, the foreign policy's priorities would be to consolidate and possibly enlarge the Mercosur and South-American integration, conceived as a space for the Brazilian international promotion. The government began to emphasize the construction of agreements with other partners, aiming to closer trade and economic relations that rest on the assumption that, “The strategy for global insertion must not overlook the countries of the south, where opportunities may be extremely attractive for the Brazilian exporter” (Amorim, 2003b). Thus took shape the integration project for South America, which drew on the negotiation of the Mercosur-Andean Community agreement, later joined by the economic complementation agreements signed with Chile and Bolivia, and the Mercosur-Peru and Mercosur-Venezuela negotiations.

In parallel, efforts were made to exploit other opportunities to strengthen ties with developing-world economic and trade partners, in particular with Mexico, South Africa, the Arab world, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, China and India. With regard to the last two markets, it is worth bearing in mind that China rose to a condition of fourth largest importer of Brazilian goods in 2002, and that bilateral trade with India practically tripled in value in the last years of the turn of the century, reaching US\$ 1.2 billion in 2003.

As for Africa, rising domestic interest for African

countries, such as Angola, Namibia and Mozambique, as well as business and joint ventures with Brazil, enabled the Brazilian government to negotiate two preference accords aiming at the establishment of a Mercosur-SACU and Mercosur-SADC free trade area. Moreover, it also enabled a streamlined coordination among social movements' representatives with regard to the African theme.

As we will see further ahead, in the Atlantic, a policy toward the African continent would become a priority. A sign thereof is that, during his first term of office, President Lula made four trips to the African continent, visiting a total of 17 countries in slightly over two years. Taken as a whole, such initiatives would come to signal the government's intention of promoting a balance with regard to what remains as constant factors in the country's international positioning strategy throughout the 1980s and 1990s: The strengthening of relations with the great powers (especially with the U.S.) and creating the required conditions for FDI inflows.

Notwithstanding the importance of these two elements in promoting Brazil overseas, with the Lula government, we observe considerable efforts to build agreements and arenas that will ensure more alternatives and, consequently, more bargaining power for the country at the global level so that Brazil may be understood as an actor with positively diverse characteristics and, thus, capable of having a leading role at the international level. Considering the cycle of international liquidity and the fact that external financing conditions showed a trend towards improvement, such actions converged to reaffirm, rather optimistically, the universalistic character of the Brazilian diplomacy in its strategy of diversifying partnerships. This activism of the Lula government also entailed the setting up of the G-20 and the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa). The former was set up shortly before the Cancun Ministerial Summit, in September 2003, when Brazil sought to bring together a group of countries interested in ending with internal subsidies to agricultural products exports and improved access to the American, European and Japanese markets.

In this coalition, as in other South-South alliances, the Lula administration pursued, besides enlarging individual economic benefits, the shared construction of a common identity, founded on commitments to a "fairer" and "more egalitarian" social and economic order. The IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) in turn, arose as a governmental proposal for the creation of a coordination and cooperation forum gathering India, Brazil and South Africa, described by the incumbent Brazilian Foreign Relations Minister as "[...] a group which, together with China and Russia, is bound to have a growing international role over the coming decades" (Amorim, 2005). That is, the government seeks to build cooperative arrangements with the most important emerging countries with the purpose of strengthening both the political and foreign trade dimensions, in the search for new strategies of action before the central economies.

In both cases, we may infer that the government follows

the same proposal: To negotiate a common agenda with a group of developing-world agricultural products' exporters in favor of greater trade liberalization for agriculture and, therefore, contrary to farm subsidies. Particularly in relation to the coalition involving Brazil, India and South Africa, it should be added that this policy is directed to the setting up of partnerships within the South-South scope capable of favoring the achievement of a permanent objective of the Brazilian diplomacy: Development hinged on a strategy guided by the relative autonomy it brings about with regard to the developed economies. Thus, the diplomacy of the Lula government would have a special place in the Brazilian political agenda. As we intend to demonstrate, the concern with regaining space in Africa and building new agreements in the most varied fora and regions, lent a markedly engaged tone to the Brazilian foreign policy, which would seek, by engaging with developing countries, the promotion of a common agenda; while simultaneously diversifying ties with the developed countries, with the aim of gaining access to markets and investments, in addition to obtaining a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council.

BRAZIL-AFRICA RELATIONS: A POINT OF INFLECTION

Despite the continuity observed at the economic level, the foreign policy of the Lula government is one of the sectors that best reflect traditional Workers' Party (PT) positions, for the diplomatic rhetoric and practice converge toward the building of preferential alliances with partners in the scope of South-South relations. A sign of that is that the African continent came to be viewed as one of the government's areas with the greatest investment in diplomatic terms, a government that, throughout its first term, not only made it a priority to reopen the diplomatic posts closed during the FHC administration, but also increased them in the African continent.

Accordingly, in the first four years, the Lula government reopened embassies deactivated in the FHC administration and inaugurated diplomatic representations and a general consulate, totaling 13 new posts, which elevated the Brazilian presence in the African continent from 18 to 30 embassies and two general consulates. A movement that, it must be noted intensified Brazil-Africa relations, as evidenced by the interest of several African States (as for instance Benin, Guinea-Conacri, Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) in opening diplomatic posts in Brazil. Between 2003 and 2006, the number of accredited African ambassadors rose from 16 to 25.

Furthermore, the Lula government adopted administrative measures in the ambit of the Foreign Relations Ministry to ensure a broadened Brazilian presence on the African continent; worthy of mention is the dismembering of the Department for Africa and the Middle East, which

gave place to the reactivation of a dedicated African continent department. We must also point out the creation of the Division for Africa - III (DAF - III), which joined the two other existing divisions (DAF - I and DAF - II), since the importance of the African States in the Ministry of Foreign Relations grew considerably, as the increased number of employees and resource allocations demonstrate. The reopening and increase in the number of diplomatic posts, as well as the administrative restructuring, should be viewed, therefore, as a direct consequence of the Brazilian government's interest in broadening the Brazilian presence on the African continent; with the subsequent reverse effect: the interest of African States in enlarging their presence in Brazil.

In such terms, there is no denying the fact that, albeit weakened, Brazil's African policy still exhibits vitality at the Brazilian diplomatic level, acquiring a unique relevance when we consider the conduction of the African policy by the current administration. Thus, we verify that considerable adjustments were made to the Brazilian diplomatic agenda, which sets out to favor regions and partners which were not valued by the FHC administration. Moreover, we observe that the execution of the Brazilian foreign policy for Africa distinguished itself from the practice developed by predecessor governments, who focused foremost on Brazil's relations with the PALOP countries. In the present administration, we perceive a clear effort to broaden the scope of the action of the Brazilian diplomacy in the African continent. The very itinerary of the presidential visits to the African continent is a clear example of the government's interest in boosting the Brazilian presence in Africa, by striving not to circumscribe the country to just one subregion or a multilateral body, as the CPLP. Without disregarding traditional partnerships, what is pursued is the strengthening of Brazil's relations with regional African bodies (such as the African Union, NEPAD, CEDEAO, SACU and SADC) so as to take advantage of the political and economic possibilities within the scope of South-South cooperation.

From this prism, it is correct to consider that, despite the apparent fragility of the African-Brazilian trade relationship, with a marginal participation in the country's trade exchange throughout the 1990s, the African continent still retains a privileged position for Brazil. In particular, it is worth noting the CPLP and ZOPACAS potential for the Brazilian diplomacy with regard to building multilateral-scope agreements, mechanisms capable of bringing together groups of nations, which, gathered around specific or generic themes, are capable of advancing common objectives in the global forums. Moreover, both the CPLP and the ZOPACAS are potential loci of intersection between various ongoing economic integration processes in the South Atlantic region, capable of favoring the exchange between the Mercosur, SADC and the ECOWAS.

At the economic level, it is worth highlighting that the

presidential diplomacy has significantly favored the Brazilian business sector in the African continent. An example thereof is the rising number of Brazilian companies, especially services exporters, which have implemented projects in the African continent. Worthy of note too is the fact that Companhia Vale do Rio Doce was awarded a competitive bid contract to mine Mozambique's Moatize coalfields, contributing thus to further strengthen ties with Brazil. Meanwhile, President Lula pardoned 95% of the public debt Mozambique has with Brazil in 2004, the equivalent to pardoning US\$ 315 million of a total US\$ 331 million. The outstanding balance, US\$ 16 million, was renegotiated.^x

In Angola, political interaction has favored Brazilian trade relations and investments in that country tremendously. The Lula government increased credit lines to the Angolan State in an effort to reach the amount of US\$ 580 million in the 2005 to 2007 three-year period, enabling the conclusion of the Capanda hydroelectric power plant, and auto and police vehicles exports, in addition to the signing of contracts for projects in the areas of infrastructure, sanitation and agriculture. Growing investments by Petrobrás in Africa are another example of the consolidation of the Brazilian presence in the continent, while the company's operations in Tanzania have also recorded growth.

Also in 2004, a cooperation agreement was negotiated in the air transportation area between Brazil and Cape Verde,^{xxi} which established direct flights between Salt Island and Fortaleza. The Brazilian government's perspective is that such agreement will become the preferential exchange route with Brazil, not only for Cape Verde, but also for the whole of the African western coast, boosting contact and, possibly, trade flows.

What remains to be assessed, therefore, is to what extent such transformations and opportunities are or will be taken advantage of by Brazil and its African partners. In the next topic, we analyze Brazil-Africa trade relations within the period studied. As will be seen, in addition to a growth in trade flows, important new opportunities are opening up for stronger and scaled-up relations between Africa and Brazil. This, obviously, brings to debate the coordination capacity, at the national domestic level, of strategies and projects capable of contributing to boost and diversify trade and investment flows between Brazil and Africa.

THE BRAZIL-AFRICA TRADE DYNAMIC

With regard to the trade relations between Brazil and the African continent, since 2002 the exchange has tripled in value. Brazilian exports to Africa increased more than 487% in the period from 1996 to 2006, with the greatest growth occurring from 2002 to 2006: 315% in four years. As for imports, there was a 478% expansion over the last ten years. In the last four years to 2006, the amount leaped

Table 2. Brazilian exports to Africa by aggregate factor (1985-2006 period in US\$ F.O.B).

Factor	Values per categories of products (US\$ F.O.B)				
	Total	Basic	Semi-manufactured	Manufactured	Special operations
Africa total	45,608,240,890	8,072,096,798	7,217,503,893	30,249,392,379	69,247,820
Share (%)	100.0	17.7	15.8	66.3	0.2

Source: Based on data by MDIC, www.mdic.gov.br.

Table 3. Overall Brazilian exports to its main trade partners in Africa by aggregate factor (1985 to 2006).

Country	Values per categories of products (US\$ F.O.B)				
	Total	Basic	Semi-manufactured	Manufactured	Special operations
Angola	4,782,919,021	554,714,487	101,139,666	4,120,866,277	4,717,297
South Africa	8,594,414,676	1,302,303,510	599,442,795	6,684,041,007	8,631,618
Nigeria	8,493,403,155	162,696,830	1,000,205,807	7,319,268,699	11,228,461
TOTAL	21,870,736,852	2,019,714,827	1,700,788,268	18,124,175,983	24,577,376
Share (%)	100	9.2	7.8	82.9	0.1

Source: Based on data by MDIC, www.mdic.gov.br.

from US\$ 2.6 to 8 billion. The bilateral trade flow rose from US\$ 6 billion in 2003 to US\$ 15 billion in 2006, figures that made the African continent, overall, rise to the fourth place in the ranking of Brazil's top trade partners, only below the U.S., Argentina and China.

Considering strictly the Brazil-Sub-Saharan Africa exchange, South Africa, Angola and Nigeria can be identified as strategic alternatives for the Brazilian diplomacy, since growth prospects and demand for investments may benefit a great number of enterprises on both sides of the Atlantic. This perception is entirely corroborated when we analyze the trade exchange between Brazil and the African continent, which, over the past years, has favored trade relations with Angola, Nigeria and South Africa. Together, these three countries account for, on average, 48% of Brazil's total exports to that continent and 53% of African imports to Brazil.

Brazilian exports to these three countries amount to significant figures in relation to the total traded with Africa, as a bloc, while also allowing us to perceive a great similarity in values per categories of products with reference to Nigeria and South Africa, which together represent 82% of the amounts exported by Brazil to that continent in the 2003 to 2006 period. Still with regard to the analysis of trade relations by categories of products (aggregate factor), it is important to stress that Brazilian exports to the African States, over the past 20 years, reveal a predominance of manufactured goods, followed at a rather smaller scale by the so-called basic products (Tables 2 and 3).

It is also relevant noting that over the last 20 years Brazil's trade balance is positive in its relations with Angola and South Africa. Yet, with Nigeria, the balance is negative

due to Brazil's oil imports. A cross-section of the last three years in these trade relations enables us to perceive a continuity of the positive balance of the Brazilian trade relations with Angola (+US\$1.1 billion) and South Africa (+US\$2.3 billion), but not so with Nigeria (-US\$3.1 billion). What is striking is the positive trade balance Brazil has with Angola over this period, which accounted for 42% of the overall amount for the last 20 years. A similar fact, yet at a lower intensity (22%), comes from South Africa, which indeed suggests a growth in exports to those two countries. A first characterization of the products exported by Brazil to these countries can be observed in Table 4. Brazil's trade balance with Nigeria has remained negative (Table 4). Despite the remarkable reduction of Brazilian oil imports from that country in 2005 when there is a 23.4% drop in expenditures of hard currency with the importation of crude petroleum oils and reductions of 70.1% with liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and of 17.2% with propane gas, in 2006 Brazil resumed and surpassed the levels of crude oils' imports reached in 2004. The recent events that led to the nationalization of the Bolivian gas reserves, with the ensuing damages to the Brazilian market supply, may further strengthen such trade relations, benefiting imports of Nigerian gas, which in the 2005/2006 were insignificant.

Still in relation to Nigeria, even when excluding Brazilian exports values recorded in the 1984 to 1985 two-year period and more recently in 2005, which, as outliers, reached extremely high levels, the evolution of the trade exchange between the two countries reveals a high level of dispersion (Figures 1 and 2). Nonetheless, such fact does not allow us to assume even an apparent relation of stability over the last 20 years. As for the figures recorded in the last four years, though signaling a tendency toward

Table 4. Evolution of the main products imported by Brazil from Nigeria (2004-2006).

Main products	2006		2005		2004	
	US\$ (F.O.B)	%	US\$ (F.O.B)	%	US\$ (F.O.B)	%
Crude petroleum oils	3,736,143,841	96.18	2,606,061,009	98.28	3,403,316,804	97.15
Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)	-	-	16,709,398	0.63	56,585,715	1.62
Liquefied butane	-	-	12,704,538	0.48	-	-
Liquefied propane	-	-	4,361,324	0.16	5,268,634	0.15
Total	3,884,591,768	100	2,651,757,958	100	3,503,157,259	100

Source: Based on data by MDIC, www.mdic.gov.br.




Figure 1. Evolution of Brazilian exports to Nigeria (1985 to 2006). Source: Based on data by MDIC, www.mdic.gov.br.




Figure 3. Evolution of Brazilian exports to South Africa (1985 to 2006). Source: Based on data by MDIC, www.mdic.gov.br.




Figure 2. Evolution of Brazilian exports to Nigeria over the last 48 months (2003 to 2006). Source: Based on data by MDIC, www.mdic.gov.br.




Figure 4. Evolution of Brazilian exports to South Africa over the last 48 months (2003 to 2006). Source: Based on data by MDIC, www.mdic.gov.br.

a possible increment of exports, these should not be considered without due care, given the unstable behavior described herein.

Contrary to the outlook for Nigeria, the evolution of Brazilian exports to South Africa is indicative of more stable relations over the last 20 years, with a slight growth rate during the 1990s, followed by a sharp rise over the last 4 years (Figures 3 and 4).

When considering the same periods, Brazilian exports to Angola suggest an appreciable growth, as can be observed in Figures 5 and 6. However, an analysis of the

correlation of the variables involved indicates a 0.52 factor (moderate correlation), which demonstrates a still rather susceptible behavior to oscillations in these relations. Hence the importance of reviewing the African foreign policy developed by Brazil over the last decades, a pre-requisite to “[...] transform the ties of friendship that unite us to the peoples of Africa into mutually beneficial economic and social progress” (Amorim, 2003a).

In light of the data presented, it is possible to affirm that, Angola, South Africa and Nigeria, as well as a growing number of African States, have regained an important position not only in Brazil’s political agenda, but also in the country’s trade agenda. Hence, the promotion of policies




Figure 5. Evolution of Brazilian exports to Angola (1985 to 2006). Source: Based on data by MDIC, www.mdic.gov.br.




Figure 6. Evolution of Brazilian exports to Angola over the last 48 months (2003 to 2006). Source: Based on data by MDIC, www.mdic.gov.br.

placing value in investments in the energy area is set to be particularly relevant to strengthen Brazil-Africa relations. A fact that becomes more evident when one evaluates the Brazilian exchange with Angola, South Africa and Nigeria. In the period analyzed, Brazil-Angola trade relations have been extremely favored by offshore discoveries. In the last years, Angola has become a leading area in oil exploration and drilling in Western Africa, and is now the second largest producer of Sub-Saharan Africa, with Cabinda responsible for more than half of the Angolan oil production. Well aware of these transformations, Brazil has sought to forge political-commercial projects, by guiding itself by the perception that Angola is not only a geographic and cultural partner, but also economically promising.

In relation to South Africa, the Brazilian foreign policy is directly influenced by the start of the democratization process and the overcoming of apartheid, which for decades relegated the South-African State to an outcast status in the main forums and world bodies. A country with which Brazil has had trade relations since the 1940s, South Africa emerges as a partner in accords with the Mercosur and the Southern Africa Customs Union. With few oil reserves, South Africa is, however, a large producer and exporter of coal. And it has attracted the attention of Brazil for that reason and for the investments

made in the country to set up a highly developed synthetic fuels industry (synfuel), which in addition to using its abundant coal reserves also relies on the offshore condensed and natural gas from Mossel Bay.

As for Nigeria, its bilateral trade with Brazil has been scaled up since the 1980s, when the Brazilian participation in the Nigerian market was so important in 1985 and 1986 that it outweighed the economic importance of England in terms of purchases from that African country (Saraiva, 1994). An OPEC member country, Nigeria is one of the world's largest oil exporters, with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, a state-controlled oil company, as the country's main upstream and downstream oil player. Brazil's Foreign Relations Ministry has concentrated efforts to create mechanisms conducive to boosting Brazil-Nigeria economic relations, currently focusing precisely on the establishment of channels that will make it possible for Brazilian companies to drill and import Nigerian oil.

In view of the aforementioned, it is undeniable that the scaling up of Brazil-Africa relations has become a reality. Although it is not possible to determine accurately the impacts caused by such movements, it is indeed a fact that they confirm the privileged position occupied by the African continent in the international positioning strategy developed by the Lula government foreign policy. This, in turn, imposes the need to review the Brazilian diplomatic and commercial actions for Africa, and entails the identification and assessment of effective channels for its promotion and dimensioning.

CONCLUSION

As was seen, Brazil-Africa relations have varied in intensity over the past decades. If in the Lula government the African continent received investments and special diplomatic attention, the same cannot be said of predecessor governments, as is evidenced by the great lengths taken to establish closer and stronger ties with the U.S., the European bloc and countries of South America. This fact led to the weakening of Brazil's African foreign policy and, consequently, to a diminution of the national presence on the African continent.

Within the framework of the Brazilian foreign policy, in the 1980s and 1990s, the African continent came to be considered as an economically and politically failed dimension for the Brazilian government. Thereby, the closure of posts and embassies in Africa came as an unambiguous sign of the country's diplomatic options and priorities: The consolidation of the Mercosur and closer relations with the advanced economies. Brazil-Africa relations were guided by a policy of concentration and selectivity. With the exception of the relations maintained with South Africa and Nigeria, the Brazil-Africa dynamic is guided by cultural affinity (linguistic) and, consequently, by prioritizing relations with the PALOP countries.

The election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, however, brought a new dynamic to the Brazilian foreign policy. The diplomatic rhetoric and practice of the Lula administration converged toward the construction of preferential alliances with partners within the scope of South-South relations. A sign thereof is that the African continent became one of the government's areas to receive the largest investment in diplomatic terms, with the President and the Foreign Relations Minister fulfilling an unprecedented visits and agreements-signing agenda. The government's foreign agenda and, in particular, the policy toward Africa, has drawn the attention of and is being closely monitored by representatives of the private sector (interested in starting or expanding their activities on the African continent) and a growing number of other social actors.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

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- ⁱⁱ G. Freyre, *Sugestões em torno de uma nova orientação para as relações internacionais do Brasil*, São Paulo, Federação das Indústrias de São Paulo, 1958. G. Freyre, *Uma Política Transnacional de Cultura para o Brasil de Hoje*, Belo Horizonte, Faculdade de Direito/UMG, 1960. For a critical analysis, see: W. da S. Gonçalves, "O realismo da fraternidade. As relações Brasil-Portugal no governo Kubitschek", (Doctoral thesis), University of de São Paulo, 1994.
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- ^{iv} A relevant aspect to be observed in Brazil's foreign policy-making is the fact that the country's Ministry of Foreign Relations has had, for decades long and regardless of the political regime, the capacity to engender the conditions for the continuity of the general guidelines adopted by its diplomacy, whereby the Itamaraty acquired a growing autonomy in relation to the social system and to the state apparatus itself. Such phenomenon has led the Itamaraty to be, *de facto*, the legislator, executor and controller of Brazil's foreign policy, including with regard to the country's African policy. On this issue, see, among others, M. R. S. de LIMA. "Globalização, Instituições Democráticas e Política Exterior." Text presented at workshop El estado del debate contemporáneo en Relaciones Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, July 27-28, 2000. M R. S. de Lima. Instituições democráticas e política exterior. Contexto Internacional, v. 22, n.º. 2, 2000. M R. S. de Lima; F. Santos. O Congresso e a política de comércio exterior. Lua Nova – Revista de Cultura e Política, n.º. 52, 2001.
- ^v J. F. S. Saraiva, "Do silêncio a afirmação: as relações do Brasil com a África", in A. L. Cervo e C. Bueno (org.), *O desafio internacional: A política exterior do Brasil de 1930 a nossos dias*, Brasília, Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1994, pp. 263-332.
- ^{vi} L. Pinheiro, "Ação e Omissão: a ambigüidade da política brasileira frente ao processo de descolonização africana, 1946-1960" (Master's dissertation), Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, 1988.
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- ^{viii} A. Freixo, "Do 25 de abril à CPLP: a inserção de Portugal nas relações internacionais contemporâneas". Master's dissertation. University of the State of Rio de Janeiro, 2001.
- ^{ix} It is important to note that, still during the military government, Brazil was the first country to recognize the independence of Angola in 1975, at the time under the rule of Marxist-Leninist MPLA.
- ^x In relation to the participation of contractor company Odebrecht, it is worth mentioning the fact that it was one of the few Brazilian private institutions that kept its operations in Angola after the start of the civil war. Establishing an unparalleled relation with the MPLA government, Odebrecht had employees kidnapped, planes destroyed and countless clashes in Angolan territory. Even today its own activity in Angola is little explored by researchers, despite worthy of more systematic and in-depth investigations. One of the few existing accounts on Odebrecht's role in Angola can be found in E. A. L. HAZIN. 25 anos em 24 horas (Testimonial). Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Jornal do Brasil/AP Editora, 1997.
- ^{xi} Over this period, Brazilian exports to the African continent were characterized by the sales of manufactured goods, such as tractors, trucks and buses, among others.
- ^{xii} A. L. Cervo; C. Bueno. *História da política exterior do Brasil*. Brasília: Editora da Universidade de Brasília, 2002, 2nd ed.
- ^{xiii} The CPLP was officially created on 17 October 1996 by a coming together of the globe's seven countries that have Portuguese as their official language – Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal and São Tomé and Príncipe, with East Timor joining the group in 2002.
- ^{xiv} The establishment of the ZOPACAS had as its essential objective to occupy the strategic void represented by the South Atlantic. Its main function was to keep the region from becoming a hotbed for conflicts, as the one that had occurred in 1982, with the Malvinas crisis; or even preventing an advance of the Soviet fleet in the South Atlantic, after the installation of pro-Communist regimes in the formerly Portuguese African colonies.
- ^{xv} Throughout the 1990s, we observe a new Brazilian international stance with regard to adhering to international regimes and cooperative arrangements, with the regional policy toward the Mercosur gaining momentum. Main changes were observed in the field of security, crowned by the signing of the NPT, in external economic relations, in the new position adopted regarding environmental and human rights issues, as well as a deepening of regional integration.

ⁱ In the period spanning from the Independence process to the first half of the twentieth century, the African theme was still rather timid in the Brazilian governmental sphere. Its appearance occurred only as a result of the Brazilian interest for Northern Africa, where the country had kept a consulate since 1861. In this period, the timidity of Brazil's relations with Africa is attributed to the priority given by the country to its border problems' diplomatic agenda, after it conquered its Independence, when Brazilian interests clearly shifted from the Atlantic Ocean to the River Plate Basin, in a process of regionalization of its foreign policy. A. da C. e Silva, *O Vício da África e outros vícios*, Lisbon, Edições João Sá da Costa, 1989.

^{xvi} On the CPLP, we suggest a special issue of *Lusotopie on Luso-Tropicalism*, published in 1997, as well as the works that follow: W. Döpcke, *A CPLP: tanto inútil quanto necessária?* *Meridiano 47*, no 26, September 2002, p.23. A. Freixo. *Do 25 de abril à CPLP: a inserção de Portugal nas relações internacionais contemporâneas*. (Master's thesis in Political History) Institute of Philosophy and Social Sciences, University of the State of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2001. J. W. Gonçalves. *Relações Econômicas e cooperação na CPLP*. In: J. F. S. Saraiva. (org.) *Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP): Solidariedade e ação política*. Brasília: IBRI, 2001. F. A. A. Mourão. *Avaliação Crítica da CPLP – O Projeto, seus Mecanismos e Viabilidade Política*. Text presented at Seminar: *A Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa – CPLP: Oportunidades e Perspectivas*. Brasília: Itamaraty, May 28-29, 2002. (mimeo). J. F. S. SARAIVA. (org.) *Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP): Solidariedade e ação política*. Brasília: IBRI, 2001.

^{xvii} Of the 34 Brazilian diplomats assigned to Africa in 1983, only 24 were still there in 1993, data which contrast with the evolution of the number of diplomats serving in other parts of the world, which, in the 1983-1993 period, went from 134 to 161 in Europe, from 44 to 52 in North America and from 68 to 77 in South America. J. F. S. Saraiva. *O Lugar da África. A dimensão atlântica da política externa brasileira (de 1946 a nossos dias)*, Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1996, p. 217-8.

^{xviii} Between 1985 and 2002, Africa's share in Brazil's foreign trade falls from 13% to around 5%, but it is worth highlighting that throughout the same period there was a moment it came to represent less than 3% of the Brazilian total imports and exports.

^{xix} A sign of that is that the PALOP countries are the main beneficiaries of Brazil's international technical cooperation, with Latin-American countries lagging behind considerably, in second, with regard to investments made. As for the technical cooperation, it is worth noting the work developed by some Brazilian institutions, as SENAI, SEBRAE, ENAP, FIOCRUZ. Yet the maintenance and efficacy of those cooperation programs are, too often, threatened by momentary interruptions or even suspensions of the activities on account of a shortage of Brazilian resources or local political problems. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning the permanent participation of Brazilian troops in the peace-keeping missions coordinated by the U.N. in African countries whose official language is Portuguese, as is the case with the U.N. first Angolan Verification Mission (UNAVEN I).

^{xx} Negotiated since 2000, the contract was only signed during the visit of President Joaquim Alberto Chissano to Brasília, in August 2004. Thus, Mozambique becomes the fourth country to have its debt pardoned by President Lula in 2004 alone. The other countries were: in July, Bolivia (which owed US\$ 52 million), and in August, Cape Verde and Gabon, whose debts amounted to, respectively, US\$ 2.7 million and US\$ 36 million.

^{xxi} In the African continent thus far only South Africa had a similar agreement with Brazil.

Full Length Research Paper

An examination of the Sierra Leone war

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This study is a historical analysis of Sierra Leone's state structure in the 20th and 21st centuries. This period was marked by defective leadership and insatiable greed that created political failure at both the national and regional level. The absence of a long-term democratic leader, coupled with the lack of institutions aimed at guiding effective resource distribution enabled the gradual collapse of the state in the wake of independence. Appropriation of wealth and corruption slowly established a cleavage between the rich elite who were in the minority, and the impoverished, uneducated and malnourished majority who eventually took up arms against the state. The latter group bonded under the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) banner, and engaged the state in a civil war that lasted from 1991 to 2002.

Key words: Civil war, state weakness, regional crisis.

INTRODUCTION

Fred, M. Hayward, a Higher education specialist has described Sierra Leone as "a pioneer" of West African history. He goes further to say that Sierra Leone has had a long history of mass political participation and representation, including its inspiration as the "Land of Freedom" in 1787 (Stevens, 1984). These traits were not visible in other West African states during colonial times, rendering Sierra Leone unique.

Despite Sierra Leone's uniqueness in West Africa, its vulnerable political climate was exposed between 1991 and 2002. Sierra Leone was a country in the process of state building, which unfortunately disintegrated when it suffered a set of violent attacks in 1991, carried out by the revolutionary united front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL). This

study predominantly discusses possible causes of the 1991 to 2002 war, the role of other African leaders in initiating the war, and the factors that enabled the protracted timeline of the war with the aim of tracing how Sierra Leone came to be politically vulnerable to the point of state failure between 1991 and 2002.

It will be unfair to treat the Sierra Leone civil war as a mindless act of rebel incursion, which was orchestrated by greedy para-militants without political grievances. My assessment of this case is grounded on the premise that the civil war was mostly a result of the patron-client system of administration that served as a foundation for state weakness during the All People's Congress (APC) administration. Not only did the politics of the country

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remain unstable in the first three decades of independence¹ socio-economic growth was equally defective, and the war caused rapid regression on the state structure. It was difficult for anyone who lived in Sierra Leone during Milton Margai's reign as Prime Minister to imagine how much the country had regressed approximately thirty years later (Hirsch, 2001).

The war, while typical of most colonial states in Africa, occurred in a country that was thought to be modern. Sierra Leone has been described by Pham (2006) as "West African's oldest modern state," which according to him, has had a constitutional tradition dating back to 1787. The deep colonial era cleavage between the Krio descendants and the protectorates, diverse political leadership styles, coupled with weak political developments since 1964 and the presence of small arms and light weapons (SALW) during the war shaped the post-independence state, and paved an avenue for state weakness.

The discussion presented in the first section of this study is grounded in a theoretical framework that builds on relevant scholarly debates pertaining to the causes of the outbreak of civil war in Sierra Leone. The subsequent section is an evaluation of the factors that helped sustain the war for over ten years. This discussion is fundamental to this study because it portrays the fragility of the Sierra Leonean state before the breakout of war in 1991, and is an important piece for understanding why Sierra Leone almost fell apart between 1991 and 2002.

The study concludes with a brief explanation of how a modern nation-state could fail in the absence of effective state structures and political institutions. The RUF/SL imposed unfathomable acts of violence on civilians—human rights abuse was the most remarkable characteristic of the war—that helped delay state building efforts for several years.

METHODOLOGY

The research conducted towards the completion of this study is inclusive of pre-colonial Sierra Leone. The researcher read books that discuss the first Portuguese arrivals into the region, and how Sierra Leone got its name.²

From this research, the researcher learned that during British colonial rule, the Krio descendants enjoyed more political freedom than the protectorate people, of which the Mende and Temne are the largest. According to Fyle (1981), "a number of Krios served in senior service positions in the administration and medical services" (Fyle 1981).

¹ On April 27 1961, Sierra Leone was granted independence from the British with Sir Milton Margai as the first prime minister.

² Sierra Leone got its name in 1462 when a Portuguese sailor/explorer (Pedro de Cintra) under the direction of the King of Portugal, set foot in the area. The Portuguese initially named the area Serra Lyoa meaning Lion Mountain (Crooks 1972), owing to its wild mountainous topography (Fyle 1962, p. 1).

Unfortunately, the Krios started falling out of British favor in the 1900s—following the 1898 rebellion.³ Governor Cardew suspected them of having instigated the rebellion, thus, started replacing formally Krio occupied government functions with British nationals, and by 1912, Krios only held 15 government posts out of 90. This preliminary research helped me understand the nature of the country before the slave repatriation, and the extent to which the slave repatriation created heterogeneity within the country.⁴

According to Doyle and Sambanis (2000), civil war is any war that has resulted in over a thousand deaths and internally displaced. Tens of thousands of casualties had been recorded out of a small population of about five million shortly after fighting culminated in Sierra Leone. Thousands had either been mutilated or raped, while an estimated 10,000 children had been captured and forced to work as child soldiers for the RUF/SL. This crisis resulted in major displacements and refugee emergencies, as Sierra Leoneans fled their homes for safety zones. The occurrence of civil war has been common in post-independence African states. Every one of such wars has occurred in a specific fashion, under a unique set of socio-political and economic conditions. Based on the uniqueness of the Sierra Leone case, it is impossible to apply general theories of revolution. The causes, actors, political history, timeline, resources and outcome of the war are unique to Sierra Leone. Any attempts to apply generalized concepts of revolutions or war, may only prove impractical. For this reason, the researcher treated this topic as a single case, mention of other African countries is solely for context. The completion of this study is dependent on information from:

1. Newspaper articles such as *Washington Post*, *New York Times* and *People's Pundit Daily* that started circulating at the start of the Sierra Leone rebel invasion in 1991. Academic articles, and peer reviewed papers (like that published by Ibrahim Abdullah in *The Journal of African Studies* (1998)), think tanks that address security studies and journal articles (*such as, Cultural Anthropology, International Security, Sierra Herald and African Studies Review International Politics etc.*).
2. Press releases and interviews or published dialogues between politicians (Sierra Leonean, and West African policy makers), military personnel who were deployed as part of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and witnesses of the decision-making processes and intervention such as UN Special Envoy—Mr. Berhanu

³ This rebellion also known as the Hut Tax War, was a resistance against British imposed taxes on the protectorate and at the time, Cardew served as governor. <http://www.sierra-leone.org/Heroes/heroes5.html>

⁴ There were instances in colonial Sierra Leone that the protectorate people lashed out at the Creoles (Krio descendants) for having a superiority complex (one instant was when Milton Margai advocated a new constitution in the 1950s).

Dinka (Ethiopia).⁵ The researcher retrieved documents of this nature from papers by Adekeye Adebajo, "The Security Council and Three Wars in West Africa" (2008) and from interviews published by the United Nations news center.

3. Data from surveys or public opinion polls of civilians from Sierra Leone and Liberia.⁶ These data have already been interpreted by international bodies like the Panel of Experts (PoE, 2000 report) and Human Rights Watch (HRW). Thus, the researcher investigated material relevant to the Sierra Leone case in order to add substance to the body of work.

For instance, the involuntary conscription of child soldiers by the RUF/SL coupled with the rebels' brutal acts of violence that were imposed on society are the most commonly highlighted features of the war. Paul Richards points out that the basic tactic (as with the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, NPFL) was youth conscription, to constitute a viable fighting force and suggest a credible "popular uprising" against the APC (Richards 1996). Unfortunately, the exact number of captured children has not yet been established, and projected figures differ by organization. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) for instance, predicted that as many as 10,000 children had affiliations with various belligerent forces, while the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) specified the involvement of about 6,000 children through the course of the war (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2004). Another UNICEF report confirms that an estimated 8,460 children were formally documented as having disappeared between 1991 and 2002 (Williamson 2006). Given the gaps in these studies, the researcher investigated data from Panel of Experts (PoE) and the Human Rights Watch (HRW) to complete this study.⁷

The number of authors in the field is small, meaning published works are scarce and evidence is sometimes insufficient. In its holistic form, the data base is inclusive of a variety of national, regional and local sources, with substantial historical profundity. A major amount of references is grounded on empirical research gotten from oral sources; and findings are often inconsistent. Scholarly works may diverge in terms of the degree of detail, topic of interest, place of interest, and certainty of their findings. The most salient problem the study encountered with the data base, has been in the primary sources. Surveys, for

instance, often fail to clearly mention the methodology that defines their findings. While other sources did not report data for some years.⁸

Some references that were made regarding the weapons' sources differed from others.⁹ These uncertainties are fathomable because of the complex (poor security) situation in the country during the war, which rendered conducting fieldwork and data compilation challenging. And because this paper is a historical analysis, it is important that dates and events are reported precisely. The study, however, managed this problem by only using sources that report similar evidence. Some of the secondary literature read, provide similar accounts of the political history of Sierra Leone, such as Harris (2014), Cole (2014) and Gberie (2005) (Appendix 1).

Causes of the war and factors that sustained the war

Causes of the 1991 to 2002 war in Sierra Leone

Partial control of political institutions, internal defense and industrial units was handed down to the elite nationalists at independence.¹⁰ The transfer of power entailed little conflict between the African elite, the grassroots indigenes and the expatriate officials. Nevertheless, Sierra Leone for one decade of its history, suffered a catastrophic internal war that resulted in socio-economic and political stagnation. Begging the question, what are the conditions that rendered Sierra Leone more susceptible to civil war? Several scholars (Dumont, 1966; Meredith, 2005; Nugent, 2004; Rodney, 1972) have cited ethnic divisions among the most prominent problems African leaders have been faced with. These scholars often argue that ethnic divisions are the ultimate cause of a lot of the rebellions that commence within the continent.¹¹ Robert Blanton argued that state conflicts are often a result of ethnic rivalry (Blanton et al. 2001), which resulted following the

⁸ For instance, www.heritage.org does not score Sierra Leone on their Economic Freedom report for 2001 and 2002 <http://www.heritage.org/index/visualize?cnts=sierraleone&src=country>

⁹ President Qaddafi denied directly sponsoring the war in Sierra Leone, his stand was corroborated in the RUF/SL pamphlet "therefore, the theory and accusations that we receive weapons and ammunition from Libya...are nonsense..." Sankoh (1995). <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/footpaths.htm>. The UN Panel of Experts, however reported that Qaddafi also assisted with the transportation of weapons, "a few months earlier, two Alouette-3 helicopters had been flown in by a Libyan government plane, but these helicopters were replaced by the newly arrived ones." Report of the Panel of Experts (2000) <https://mondediplo.com/IMG/pdf/un-report.pdf>

¹⁰ Complete power was not handed down to the African leaders, as Great Britain remained a salient figure in Sierra Leone's politics. Sierra Leone only became a republic in 1978, until then, it still functioned with a British representative, Governor General within the country.

¹¹ "Africa, for example, was saddled with an irrational political map upon decolonization, one that corresponds to neither geography, ethnicity, nor economic functionality. The international system supported that region's leaders' decision to retain those boundaries, even as...costs made those boundaries more porous, and political units more susceptible to mutual destabilization" (Fukuyama 2006, forward in Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies*).

⁵ He was obliged by the United Nations to work alongside the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and ECOWAS toward a peace settlement, and bringing the crisis to an end.

⁶ Sources could include: www.gallup.com or www.pollingreport.com, www.France24.com and www.infratest-dimap.de. Most data are estimated, due to the absence of an official database.

⁷ One of the child soldiers reported to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that before he was captured, the rebels shot both his parents in front of him, gripped him by the throat, tied both of his hands, cut parts of his body with a blade and placed cocaine in it. He goes on to say "I had no option but to join them because I no longer had parents" (Truth and Reconciliation Committee Report 2004).

partition of Africa. Sierra Leone's colonial history indicated that ethnic polarization was a probable explanation for the violence that engulfed the country in 1991. The existence of heterogeneity was indeed created within Sierra Leone during the colonial era.

In this regard, Pham (2006) notes that diversity stemmed from the cultural variations between the Krio descendants, and the indigenous inhabitants of the country who dwelled in the hinterlands.¹² The imperialists accentuated the peculiarities between diverse ethnic groups and in so doing enforced tribal differences (Shillington, 1989). Indeed, ethnic polarization eventually caused friction between the Krio descendants, the grassroots chiefs and the protectorate elite, leading the British to draw up a new constitution in 1951, which afforded greater participation to the protectorates (Kilson 1966).

This political changes birth a sense of nationalism and (even) unity between the indigenes and the creoles. The result of this research into the heterogenous Sierra Leonean society proved that ethnic polarization, even though visible during the colonial era, did not factor into the causes of the RUF/SL-led war. However, political division played itself out when Stevens refused to sign the independence constitution under the allegation that Milton Margai's government was still British controlled. This first political disagreement shaped the political foundation of Sierra Leone as an independent state.

Another potential cause of violent revolts has been attributed to the flawed nature of the post-independence political structure. Stevens and his APC created, according to Harris (2014), "a new indirect rule: a highly hierarchical system reliant on 'traditional' authority on top of the paternalistic model developed under the British and the Krios" (Harris, 2014).

The absence of a guided state structure for a coherent and suitable distribution of state resources and power created economic and social imbalance, which eventually birth conflict. Stevens and the APC governed Sierra Leone through a corrupt personalized system, pushing fair resource distribution and security to the rear. The APC government was more concerned with spending income generated from the distribution of raw material, than enforcing socio-economic growth.

This system of administration was faulty because if predefined social institutions are founded on weak collective interests when state building commences, their common identities have the likelihood to be easily obliterated through the state's distributive largesse (Vandewalle, 1998). The partiality of independence was soon visible in the political scene, as democratic elections eventually resulted in undemocratic governments.

In addition, Conteh (2001) maintains that "what was to

¹² Sierra Leone according to Fyle (2006, p. xxvii), is only 73,326 square kilometers holding a population of about 4 million people; Sierra Leone is home to 16 ethnic groups, the largest being the Temne in the Northern region and the Mende in the South and Eastern regions (Fyle 2006).

become a diamond boom, became a curse on the nation. Herein lies the irony. The economic benefits of diamonds, which were meant to free people from the clutches of poverty instead enslaved them in the clutches of greed" (Conteh, 2001). This personalized structure caused the state to degenerate and drift apart. The fabric of the state had thereby been weakened and infested with causes which rendered conflict inevitable.

Besides the APC's adoption of this new form of indirect rule, multipartism was abolished in 1978 and fuel prices were increased. Discontent with these changes in government administration resulted in riots in Freetown. The transformation to a one-party state did not completely remove all political threats to the state, as on March 23, 1991 the biggest threat to the APC's political life was witnessed as RUF/SL rebels attacked civilians in Bomaru in the Eastern province led by former Sierra Leonean army corporal, Foday Sankoh. These attacks quickly became the most vicious political campaign in Sierra Leonean history (Abdullah, 1996; Fayemi, 2004; Fearon, 2004). Sankoh's aim as stated in the RUF/SL pamphlet was to rid Sierra Leone of the corrupt APC party (RUF/SL 2006).

Moreover, a long-term strong government was absent, as such, developmental strategies faltered and state resources were misused. There was urgent need for a strong government to adequately oversee developmental growth. The ultimate importance of a strong political structure (government) has long been identified by philosophers, like Hobbes (1651), who maintain that people form governments to rule them, and submission to the state through a social contract gives the state the opportunity to foster its abilities and protect her from attacks. The government of Sierra Leone is typical, as it was rendered extremely vulnerable (if not weak) by the constant coups d'état, and the need for reconstruction was paramount to ensure survival. The occurrence of repeated military-led coups severely weakened government administrative and coercive capabilities, rendering the state vulnerable to a revolutionary movement.

Shortly after independence, Sierra Leone exhibited both distributive and weak state features. Siaka Stevens' reign was the most extreme at appropriating the nation's raw material for meeting his self-interested ends.¹³ During Stevens's administration, the political structure of Sierra Leone shortly after independence relapsed from a patrimonial structure to a patron-client system.¹⁴ The

¹³ Stevens confirmed his system of administration in his autobiography, "he must hand out largesse; educate not only his own children but also those of family members...Money slips through his finger like quicksilver and he can never have enough of it to satisfy his dependents. When it can be had so easily, when all that is required of him is influence in tipping the scale..." (Stevens 1984).

¹⁴ Weber (1947) explained patrimonialism as the situation in which the administrative apparatus is appointed by and responsible to the leader. Patrimonial rule has similarities to the feudal system of lord and vassal. Weber said the difference is that the feudal relationship is more ritualized and regularized, and thus more stable, than the ad hoc arrangements of patrimonialism. Meanwhile, clientelism or patron-client method of administration refers to a complex chain of personal bonds between political

patron-client system of administration was made possible because of the absence of democratic state institutions, which made it “considerably easier for a leader in Africa than for a leader elsewhere to pursue personal gains free from any restraints other than his own conscience, while it remains comparatively difficult for him to pursue goals that will make significant changes in his country” (Cartwright, 1978).

Given that the clientelist system of government has the tendency to flourish in vulnerable political and economic environs, it is fundamental to the “politics of survival” for both patrons and clientele (Migdal, 1988). This administrative structure was not designed for a new state like Sierra Leone because it paved the way for massive appropriation of resources and eventual state weakness. The numerous coups that threatened the survival of the state only further worsened the political climate, leading to the formation of PANAFU, and later RUF. The corrupt nature of the APC, is the ultimate reason Sankoh projected for attacking the country with the aim of taking over control of political power.¹⁵

In analyzing the effects of post-colonial governments, one should never simply assume that any of such reasons will primarily influence the needs of any one given state. Ethnic divisions, for instance, did not pose a problem to Sierra Leonean politics, like it did in Nigeria. The patron-client system of government in Sierra Leone eventually resulted in civil war.

Thus, the intersection of the colonial regime and the newly formed independent governments that resulted in the patron-client system of administration holds the answer to the cause of the civil war. The argument that the political arrangements passed on to the new independent African leaders degenerated into dictatorial arrangements, is widely accepted in 21st century scholarship (Rodney, 1972). In the opinion of this study, power did not degenerate into dictatorial arrangements, independence leaders adopted these forms of governments from the exiting colonialists.

Unfortunately, the structure of the independent Sierra Leone state varied from the colonial state. Thus, while failure of British colonial rule resulted in the fight for nationalism, failure of the patron-client rule resulted in a 12-year civil war. These arguments add much context to this essay, but do not discuss the factors that sustained the rebel incursion in Sierra Leone. In this light, the next part of this study is aimed at discussing the role of SALW, and revolutionary heads of state in fostering the war.

patrons or bosses and their individual clients or followers. These bonds are founded on mutual material advantage: the patron furnishes excludable resources (money, jobs) to dependents and accomplices in return for their support and cooperation (votes, attendance at rallies) (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith. 2002, pp. 2-6).

¹⁵ “We are fighting for a new Sierra Leone. A new Sierra Leone of freedom, justice and equal opportunity for all. We are fighting for democracy and by democracy we mean equal opportunity and access to power to create wealth through free trade, commerce, agriculture, industry, science and technology.” Foday Sankoh. “Footpaths to Democracy: Toward A New Sierra Leone” <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/footpaths.htm>

Factors that sustained the Civil War

Before the war we had lights, there was water in the taps, but now because of these guns we have nothing. Now we put kerosene in our lamps and have to fetch water. We had school libraries, now the buildings are standing empty (Lawson 2006)¹⁶

Zainab Kamara is a representative of the ‘voice of the masses’ (these were the civilians who suffered the most casualties from the cross-fire between Sankoh’s rebels and the government). The extent of abuse that the war imposed on civilians was new to the region. The only other regional war that reported comparable abuse was the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Given that the war was fought with the bare minimum of weapons, the timeframe was unusual. The war went on for such a long time that the Yamoussoukro communique in March left the country split between those in favor of peace and those who wanted the war to continue¹⁷.

The existence of diamonds laid the foundation for prolonged civil war as the enormous profits that were generated from the trade were used for the procurement of armament.¹⁸ In the words of Paul Orogun, “these warlords meticulously have cultivated both regionally and internationally diverse and elusive networks of trade partners that span African regional neighboring countries, Eastern Europe, Russia, the Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, and the Middle East...The RUF sustained its war making capabilities...by retaining territorial control over the diamond-producing mines located in the northeastern regions of the country” (Orogun 2004).

States were also able to sell weapons in exchange for not only money, but other commodities like diamonds, enabling buyers with natural resources such as Taylor to afford unlimited arms. Schneider and Caruso (2011) throw more light on the situation by stating that, “in situations where access to normal banking channels is very difficult (for example, as with most non-state actors), the financing of arms deals often takes a different form, most often through commodity exchanges...illicit arms transfers to Liberia and Sierra Leone were often financed with diamonds and timber concessions”. The RUF/SL benefited from the illicit sales of diamonds to enable the continuous inflow of weapons that enabled a prolongation of the fight against the state.

The presence of SALW played an important role in sustaining the 1991 conflicts. The Sierra Leone military per Cole (2014), was ill-equipped relative to the RUF/SL. In

¹⁶ Zainab Kamara was a counsellor at Makeni in the Bombali District in 2006 when Lawson (2006) interviewed him for a control arms research paper.

¹⁷ These group consisted predominantly of the battle group commanders and uneducated rebels who were uncertain about a future without military victory or state power (Abdullah 1998, p. 228).

¹⁸ The PoE 2000 reports on Sierra Leone note that the RUF/SL owned conflict diamond mines in the Kono District and the Tongo Field among others. Their diamond production was estimated at one eighth of Sierra Leone’s best year (PoE 2000, para 69 and 79).

this regard, Abass Bundu ECOWAS Secretary-General of Sierra Leonean origin, pointed out that the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) was small, consisted of about "3,694 in total, largely ceremonial and ill-equipped to counter the insurgents. Armed with antiquated rifles, armored cars that did not work, poor communications, and no efficient ground transportation system to speak of, let alone air strike capability, they could hardly shoot, move and communicate" (Bundu 2001).

In addition to this number, was the paramilitary force (SSD) that had been created by Stevens. This force comprised of about eight hundred personnel, and one hundred coast guards. This number could barely muster two infantry exercises, armed with mostly defective Nigerian-made G3 rifles (Gershoni, 1997). Worse still, routine military to test combat readiness were hardly conducted.

According to Pham (2006), between 1977 and 1991, there had been a grand total of two such drills. Plus, the few supplies that were allocated to military units were often misappropriated.¹⁹ The RUF/SL rebels by contrast enjoyed a steady flow of arms through their Liberian allies. The rebels were armed with M-16 and AK-47 rifles, most of which were obtained from Ukraine, and transshipped through Burkina Faso. The availability of these weapons enabled the RUF/SL to control the bush and Kailahun District from 1991 to 2001 when support from Taylor started diminishing.²⁰

Not only did weapons availability sustain the war for over ten years, they also imposed stagnation on state building efforts. SALW are a policy and security threat that adversely impact weak states. Beyond the loss of lives, the impacts of wide-scale violence were devastating on public institutions, the national economy, infrastructure, and social cohesion of Sierra Leone (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008; World Bank, 2011).

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs defines this arms problem as a worldwide scourge. In the same light, former U.N Secretary-General, Kofi Annan referred to small arms as "weapons of mass destruction in slow motion." Their proliferation he argued, is one of the key challenges in preventing conflict in the next century. More than any other type of arms and ammunition, assault rifles have "changed the face of war in Africa" and other developing countries, noted Peter Marwa, a retired Kenyan army colonel, currently an arms analyst (Coker, 2001).

Assault rifles and other small arms are responsible for 90% of all conflict-related deaths in the last decade, a number that equals about 3 million civilians, as was stated by the International Red Cross. These economy-class weapons fueled an economy-class war in Sierra Leone,

¹⁹ Pham (2006) notes that military resources were often diverted to the clandestine mining operations run by officers or stolen and sold by desperate and ill-paid enlisted men (Pham 2006, p. 84).

²⁰ Taylor was involved in a war against the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) which had intensified and was drawing in Sierra Leonean fighters headed by Bockarie (Harris 2014, p. 116).

leaving the future of the state uncertain for almost a decade.

Support from Qaddafi, Taylor, and Compaore also played a major role in bolstering the rebels' morale and subsequently fostering the war. Though some of the charges against Taylor may have been overstated by the Sierra Leone government and reported by the media without thorough investigation (Abdullah, 1998), Taylor, and Compaore, nevertheless facilitated the supply of arms for use by the RUF/SL. The bloody conflict in Sierra Leone was closely entwined with a wide range of external factors prevalent in West African politics.

Richards (1996) argues that Qaddafi retained some "residual sympathy for the RUF/SL as one of the sincerer African attempts to apply aspects of his youth-oriented revolutionary philosophy" due to his own difficulties with the sub-Saharan African venture. Berman (2001) further suggests that copies of the letters Sankoh allegedly wrote to Qaddafi reveal that in the mid-1990s, Libya provided the RUF/SL with the necessary funds to acquire weapons. The reasons for why Taylor supported Sankoh vary considerably. Some argue that his support was out of disdain for Momoh, while others suggests that economic motives were the guiding factor for Taylor.²¹ Given that the district that falls on the boundary line between Sierra Leone and Liberia, which was rich in natural resources, economic reasons were possibly the reason for Taylor's decision to support the RUF/SL (Richards 1996). Taylor was very instrumental in providing weapons for the RUF/SL (with help from Compaore), providing military training to RUF/SL recruits, and permitting the participation of his NPFL in the initial phase of the Sierra Leone war.

The RUF/SL propaganda aimed at mobilizing disenfranchised unemployed youths, worked at increasing the rebel population, and deterring the SLA. Unemployed youths in the rural areas who were dissatisfied with their government's failure to provide basic amenities and combat the insurgency, were being recruited to join the rebel group. The basic tactic for the RUF/SL was youth conscription, "to constitute a viable fighting force and suggest a credible popular uprising against the APC" (Richards, 1996). Conscriptions resulted in double jeopardy, as new recruits risked executions by the RUF/SL and rural civilians.²² Fear of execution was enough to retain them in the RUF/SL throughout the course of the war. By 1993, Fyle (2006) reports that the rebel force had grown in number, and had become stronger than at the start of the war (with various groups operating in the

²¹ Authors like Abdullah (1998), Gberie (2005), and Pham (2006) all discuss Taylor's role in the RUF/SL war. Meanwhile, during Taylor's prosecution, he unequivocally denied providing any military assistance to the RUF/SL. He even referred to Sam Bockarie's presence in Liberia as a gesture of goodwill. However, upon further investigation, it will revealed that the RUF/SL received regular training in Liberia at Gbatala near Gbanga (PoE 2000, P. 35-40).

²² New recruits who considered deserting the RUF/SL were "trapped by this suicidal double jeopardy...and by the expectation of revenge at the hands of rural civilians who judged all members of the movement by the values of its lumpen leadership" (Abdullah and Muana 1998, p. 180).

bushes).

In addition, the continuous coups d'état that occurred while the war was ongoing contributed to prolonging the time frame. Two successful coups were instigated in 1992 and 1996, but the coup attempted in May 1997 by the APRC failed to permanently unseat the SLPP from power. These coups gave the RUF/SL a tangible platform to argue that their fight was guided by political reasons, and added to their number of recruits as they formed a merger with the APRC against the state.

Furthermore, Momoh's leadership capability played a dominant role in keeping the RUF/SL focused and united throughout the course of the war. He was strategic in his attacks against the state, and in 1993 when the RUF/SL almost suffered defeat, good strategy was the tool that sustained the insurgent unit. "By late 1993...we were pushed to the border with Liberia. Frankly, we were beaten and on the run, but our pride and deep sense of calling will not let us face the disgrace of crossing into Liberia as refugees or prisoners of war. We dispersed into smaller units, whatever remained of our fighting force" (RUF/SL (1995).

Smaller RUF/SL units infiltrated Sierra Leone and engaged in "audacious hit-and-run attacks on government controlled villages and ambushing isolated SLA units" (Pham, 2006). Division of the RUF/SL into smaller units was a strategic move on Sankoh's part, which favored his rebel group, enabled their reinvigoration in 1994, and ensured the subsequent prolongation of the war for another nine years. Per Olu Gordon the RUF/SL could be described as a "military organization with a political agenda not a political movement with an armed wing" (Gordon, 1997).

The need for political stabilization in post-colonial Africa continues to be of major concern to the international community, as the UN has been seen constantly struggling with issues of peace and security. Rebel wars like that witnessed in Sierra Leone have drawn scholars, politicians, and policy makers' attention to the causes of these violent movements, with the aim of finding answers to how they can be prevented.

Scholars like Gurr (2011) have analyzed the origin of rebellions by looking at society's grievances, while Skocpol (1979) and Tilly (1978) have looked for answers in sociopolitical structures and political mobilization (the occurrence of organized violence), respectively. Gurr's *Why Men Rebel* model suggests that "governments sustain or create the conditions for conflict at every step in the model. Government-imposed inequalities are a major source of grievances; repressive policies increase anger and resistance; denial of the right to use conventional politics and protest pushes activists underground and spawns terrorist and revolutionary resistance" (Gurr 2011).

The Sierra Leone war was not the result of spontaneous action (as was seen in Tunisia in 2011), but of effective planning. Stevens' patron-client government was losing legitimacy and popularity—the state was failing to provide

basic amenities (security and livelihood) to most its citizens. As such, Sankoh and his followers fought to implement their idea of a democratic regime.

Conclusion

The Sierra Leone civil war revealed two major facts:

1. It was the result of diverse interfaces pertaining to structural complications between the Sierra Leonean society and the state. The patron-client structure of the Sierra Leone state did not promote the rule of law, transparency, and sustainable economic development. As such, corruption prevailed, distribution of wealth became indiscriminate, and civilians formed anti-state movements (like the Pan-African Union—PANAFU) in which they discussed their grievances against the state. Moreover, the transformation of Sierra Leone from multiparty politics to a single-party state—under Stevens' administration—tremendously reduced civilian participation in politics. Civilian participation in the political process usually enables society to have a voice in the affairs of the state. Unfortunately, this was not the case between the 1978 adoption of a single party constitution and the 1996 general elections that resulted in a win for the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP). Finally, human development was not promoted in Sierra Leone before the outbreak of the war in 1991. The creation of the first western-style university in West Africa (Fourah Bay College) on February 18, 1827, meant that the British were committed to enforcing human development. This commitment was not upheld by the APC government upon assuming power from the SLPP.²³ These existential problems increased grievances within the populace subsequently resulting in the emergence of the RUF/SL.

2. While diamonds arguably played a substantial role in financing the war; once it was ongoing, the absence of a strong state enabled the sustainment of the war.

The civil war in Sierra Leone revealed that the success of new nations is reliant on a strong democratic state and society. Clientelism laid the foundation for state weakness, which in turn served as a legitimate political motivation for outright war. The motivation of African political leaders as portrayed by Stevens was grounded in the need to provide economic satisfaction for themselves and their dependents. This motivation can hardly be curbed, due to the absence of sufficient structural and cultural restraints built into the political systems. The problems faced by weak states are daunting, but effective efforts at democracy could possibly ameliorate the problem of wealth appropriation, and reduce episodes of grievance-driven rebel movements. A study of Sierra Leone's political history resulted in the realization that

²³ President Momoh "went as far as to declare that education was a privilege not a right" (Harris 2014, p. 76).

socio-economic developments coupled with political advancement are central for the survival of the state. In the absence of effective socio-economic, political, administrative, police, and military organizations the state is rendered vulnerable and disposed to collapse.

On January 18, 2002, the war was officially announced over, and a peace ceremony was attended by RUF/SL interim leader Sessay, President Kabbah and international guests. The war had ended and a period of disarmament and demobilization was currently ongoing. The cleavage that had been created as a result of the political complications that characterized the Sierra Leonean state from autonomy to 2002 were finally being repaired with honest attempts being made at democracy. The birth of democracy was not the only positive fallout from the war, but a strengthened nation state was among the most conspicuous transformations.²⁴ From the civil war was birth a more democratic, bureaucratic, peaceful and ingenious state. Data from *Global Finance and Heritage* suggest that Sierra Leone experienced increased economic growth and freedom, improved standard of living, and increased foreign direct investment inflow following the civil war.²⁵ However, these growth rates slowed considerably with the Ebola outbreak in the region, and corruption persisted. Sierra Leone is a long way from attaining the status of a strong state, and the civil war served as a contributing factor towards hampering socio-economic and political growth.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author have not declared any conflict of interests.

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²⁴ The first post conflict elections were scheduled for May 14, which resulted in President Kabbah's re-election to office. Multiparty politics and democracy ensued ever since the first post-civil war elections.

²⁵ In 2013, the country was nominated amongst the world's best emerging markets banks in Africa.

Appendix 1. A contracted timeline of Sierra Leone's political history

Year	Event
April 1961	Officially gained independence from the British
March and August 1964	Njala University College was opened, and the official state currency, the Leone was established, respectively
1967	The APC narrowly wins the general elections. President John Lansana is ousted a few days after swearing in by military officers, and Andrew Juxon-Smith heads a provisional government (the National Reformation Council – NRC)
1968	NRC is overthrown, and John Banguru turned over the government to the APC LED BY Siaka Stevens
1969	The University of Sierra Leone is instituted, with an amalgamation that consisted of Fourah Bay College and Njala University
April 1971	Sierra Leone is named a republic, headed by Siaka Stevens
1975	Sierra Leone Development Company (DELCO) declares bankruptcy, ending iron ore mining in Marampa
1977	Widespread anti-government protests commenced
1978	Sierra Leone becomes a one-party state, and the All People's Congress (APC) is declared the sole political party
1985	Major-General Joseph Saidu Momoh assumes office of the presidency, upon Siaka Steven's retirement
March 23, and September, 1991	First reports of civil war on the eastern frontier are reported (to be led by former corporal Foday Sankoh). In September, the state is returned to multiparty politics, and a cabinet comprised of non-members of parliament is equally enforced by the constitutional amendments
October 1991	Adopted an official constitution
April 29, 1992	The government of Joseph Momoh is removed from power by means of a military coup d'etat
January 18, 2002	The civil war officially ended with the UN declaration of cessation of hostilities

Full Length Research Paper

Eritrea's national security predicaments: Post-colonial African syndrome

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The post-2001 Eritrea is repeatedly viewed as North Korea of Africa: small state with isolationist foreign policy that could not burden totalitarianism, that the critical young generation is leaving the state and the remaining population is in a military uniform waiting for an imaginary enemy, that all the critical state institutions are decayed, that the port-based (Massawa and Assab) national economy lost its economic comparative and competitive advantage to Djibouti for decades to come, as a result the policy of "self-reliance" in era of globalization proved to be incompatible with the "Singaporization" of Eritrea. The regime has leased the Eritrean ports to Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, military based for Sunni Arab states fighting the Shiites in Yemen, to prolong regime survival at the expense of Eritrea's long term interests which will make Eritrea a proxy base for Middle East's superpower military competition. Eritrea is thus in the process of becoming a second Somalia in a region where fragile states are pervasive, and the neighboring states mainly Ethiopia should develop a road map to contain the worst case scenario: state collapse. This study therefore aims to critically analysis the post-independence nation building project in Eritrea, and its subsequent dynamics with a particular focus on the post-Ethiopia- Eritrea war of 1998-2000. The study mainly uses secondary data including government policies, declarations, interviews of top officials, and updated discussion papers posted in different Eritrea related websites.

Key words: The idea of the state, nation-building, Eritrean nationalism, "one-people, one-heart", Eritrean national security predicament, Post-colonial African syndrome.

INTRODUCTION

The State of Eritrea, the latest African state next to South Sudan to join the UN family of nations, won its independence as a defacto state in 1991, and de jure state in 1993 through referendum. However, Eritrea had passed through historical ups and downs on the march to independence: first colonized by Italy and transferred to Britain as 'mandate territory' until 1952.

Upon the United Nations' decision, Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia as an autonomous region, a situation that soon deteriorated. The federation was not well-come by all actors including the Eritrean contending parties and Ethiopian government. After ten years, the federation was abrogated and Eritrea was re-integrated into Ethiopia in 1962. On the eve of the abrogation of the federation, the

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Eritrean, particularly the Muslim lowland Eritreans and later joined by the highlanders, declared the bloody armed struggle in 1961 that lasted for three decades.

The post independent state and nation- building process was framed to be the slogan “*Hade Hizbi, Hade Libi*”¹. Eritrea’s post independent state and nation-building process was not smooth even though the success of the liberation struggle sparked prospects for a strong, united and stable Eritrea. The crisis is not solely the result of the challenges of new state building process but also strongly related to the evolution of Eritrean nationalism and its foundation; the contradictions and divisions among Eritrean nationalists on the idea of the state of Eritrea and Eritreanism

Methodologically, the study examined the national security challenges of the post 2001 Eritrean in relation to the different theoretical approaches to national security, Eritrea’s historical trajectories, Eritrean identity formation, the nature of the nationalist movements and goals of the struggle, the post-independence state building processes and the policies designated to ensure the goal. Moreover, externally the national security of Eritrea would also be examined in relation to the challenges that evolved out of the 1998-2000 war with Ethiopia: as Eritrea’s national significant others.

This study to critically analyze the post-independence nation building project in Eritrea, and its subsequent dynamics with a particular focus on the post-Ethiopia-Eritrea war of 1998-2000. The study mainly uses secondary data including books, articles, government policies, declarations, interviews of top officials, and updated discussion papers posted in different Eritrea related websites.

LITERATURE REVIEW

National security, traditionally, has been exclusively defined as state’s ability to survive and prosper in the self-help anarchic international system (Wing, 2000). State’s security threats were viewed external in their origin, and militaristic in their nature. The instruments of defense were military capabilities, and wars were considered to be fought outside the jurisdiction of the state (Ibid). Therefore, national security was defined as phenomenon of war: focusing on the threat, use and control of military force (Walt, 1991).

However, the end of the cold war served as a major blow to the traditional schools, and led to the emergence of alternative voices within the security studies calling for “widening and ultimately deepening” of the subject (Hough, 2004). The Widening schools argued for horizontal inclusions of symmetric and asymmetric threats (both military and non-military) that could emerge both from outside and inside of the state, and instigated by both state and non-state actors (Ibid, Buzan, 1997).

The Deepening schools, however, argued for vertical actors’ redefinition of referent objects for security to include non-state actors mainly human beings (Williams, 2004). Accordingly, states are thus not only the referent and providers of security but also could be source of threats to their citizens. And the major threats to national security are emanating from within the state due to lack of agreed consensus on the idea of the state, that is, *the nation and its organizing ideology*, by all responsible actors though external threats are existential but could be easily deterred.

According to Buzan (2008), national security is basically about building an established legitimacy on the idea of the state by those who are claiming to be nation-builders and citizens of the state through establishing an imagined community. The idea of the state is thus the pillar to national security supported by defensive physical base (territory) and established institutions of the state. It is “needed to be firmly rooted in the minds its citizens and in the minds of other states, so that the idea of national self-rule is needed to have a high legitimacy in international system” (Ibid: 78).

Most states, however, are multi-ethnic nations as opposed to the traditional conception of nation-state which makes national security predicaments very complex especially to nation-builders in the third world. Cognizant of this, since the African states are creations of colonialism which makes them inorganic, failed to evolve from internal struggle, and incompatibly transplanted over pre-colonial primordial identities, the post-independent nation-builders therefore inherited the protracted and conflictual nation-building process (Meressa, 2013).

The decolonized states thus emerged as “part-nation-states” (Buzan, 2008) sharing the same ethnic groups with their neighbors, and such ethnic groups remain marginalized minorities which later paved a fertile ground for secessionist- irredentist movements to challenge the nation building process, and poses actual and potential national security threats (Ibid) .

The problem with “part-nation state” is that being ethnic groups living on the other side of the border are made to be minority, and the nation-builders of the process of becoming (states which are not full-fledged) designed their strategies of reintegrating ethnic groups on the other side of border as mobilizing instrument and eventual formation of relevant enemies of the national security. Moreover, such national security is naturally vulnerable to secession-irredentist obsession that weakens the very idea of national security (Meressa, 2010).

The failure to build strong idea of nation-state and national security of nonwestern mainly African states is further complicated by their late entrance to nation-state system and early stage of nation-building process that constrains nation-builders to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of their society (Ayoob, 2005, 1995). Besides, the simultaneous and contingent nature of nation-building process of African states also served the nation-builders to rely on the “idea of war makes state”, and their

¹ Tigrigna for “One People, One heart”, Eritrea’s Motto of nation building

preoccupations with war making, expansion and resource extraction as means of state making in hurry (Tilly, 1985).

Therefore, the national security challenges that new states face are, on one hand, the results of externalizing and overemphasizing on externally incoming threats and hence securitization and militarization of the nation-building process internally (Bundegaard, 2004). On the other hand, failure to cultivate, strengthen and build an integrative consensus of citizens on the idea of the state which ultimately results in winner-loser complex and negation of the core idea of the state (Medhane, 2004).

Eritrea's national security predicament: Historical antecedents

Colonial Legacy: Identity invention or imagination 1890 to 1952

Eritrean national security challenges are, partly, part of the broader African security challenge; imagining and building decolonized nation-state system, and neutralizing the colonial induced differences through forging mobilizing principles of commonly colonized and oppressed people, and ultimately forming new colonially created territorial identities (Bundegaard, 2004; Meressa, 2013).

In line with this, today's Eritrean nation-building challenges are basically the results of divergent conceptions of the idea of Eritreanism that traces back to post Italian periods, and the subsequent developments of divergent strategies of framing the future Eritrea and Eritreanism (Yosief, 2013).

Most literatures and informants indicated that the half a century Italian rule did not have a substantial impact on the Eritrean identity formation. Even though the Italians boasted the economic wellbeing of Eritrean in relation to Ethiopian, and were able to elevate the Muslim lowlander Eritrean (local known as *Metahit*) to the parity with the Christian Eritrean, it was not effective in forging new identity and western types of elites to lead the post-colonial nation-building process (Tekeste, 1997).

The highlanders (local known as *kebessa*) who were considered relatively politically conscious due to their access to the state system and modern missionary education were still with their pro-Ethiopian ties, and demanded unconditional union with Ethiopia (Ibid). Muslim lowlanders, in their demand for immediate independence, failed to convince the highlanders to form a collective post-primordial identity of Eritreanism. Instead, the Muslim League (later Eritrean Liberation Front) evolved into Islamic primordialist armed movement in 1961 (Meressa, 2013).

The parity system, however, laid the basis to the later politicization of Muslim/Christian, lowlander/highlander dichotomies of Eritrean politics and nationalism. And hence, Eritrean identity remains dominantly primordialist (Muslim/Christian, *Metahit/kebessa*) though they claimed

Eritrean identity was/is western industrial exposed modern identity when they pretend to view Ethiopian counterparts, as their relevant others, as uncivilized traditional societies.

The Italian period based modernist school of Eritrea identity, according to Abdulkader (2013), argued that the Italians introduced positive innovations, such as urbanization, a transportation system (especially the railways) and the development of the Massawa and Assab ports. They also encouraged the migration of peasants from Tigray to Eritrea, who settled in *kebessa* as labor force. In addition, the Italians recruited a large number of soldiers (*askari*) into their army who settled in cities and towns. This group contributed significantly to the urbanization process and developed a national consciousness due to their involvement in various colonial wars.

The British mandate period based modernist school of Eritrea identity, however, rejected the Italian thought and argued that Eritrean identity consciousness begun to surface onto the Eritrean political spectrum during the British mandate period (Yosief, 2013). The British in their attempt to prepare the Eritreans to decide their future allowed freedom of speech and association, and as a result the Eritreans began to structure and define their future state (Ibid; Tekeste, 1997). And hence, the pre-colonial and colonial (pre-mandate era) Eritrean identity was not historically and politically sufficient enough to justify their subsequently evolved colonial thesis (Meressa, 2013).

The 1946 Bet Georges conference was the first historically noticed intra-Eritrean gathering to debate on their future, and determine their identity consciousness. However, the conference ended up without agreement due to the divergent views of the existing Muslim and Christian political groups on future Eritrean state and Eritreanism.

The divergent outlooks were reflected in the organization of the contending groups and their mobilizations. Most of the Muslim lowlanders (ML) were organized around the "Al-Rabita al Islamiya al Eritriya" (the Muslim League) mainly since December 1946, and claimed independence of Eritrea on the basis of anticipatory fear and mistrust that the union would bring oppression under autocratic and Christian Ethiopia (Mesfine, 1988).

According to Ellingson (1977), the ML made a clear statement against unification in front of the Four Power Commission: "Is it just that a still barbaric and primitive nation such as the Ethiopians – whose government is unable to improve the lot of its own people – should come into possession of a territory which is far more disciplined, advanced and civilized than the Abyssinians?"

Conversely, most of the Christian highlanders were organized under the unionists on the basis of anticipatory hope that the union would bring dignity and freedom (Mesfine, 1988). And the remaining political groups were in between the two major organizations. From this,

possible to infer, that the absence of agreed consensus on the imagined or invented idea of the state and the endemic natures of the highland/lowland, Christian/Muslim dichotomies in Eritrean politics in which the establishment of inclusive Eritreanism require to properly integrate these realities .

The Inorganic federation: A hybrid solution and internationalization of the problem 1952 to 1961

Failing to provide an internally agreed solution, which evolved out of a half a century Italian colonial rule, to their future destiny made the Eritrean case to be decided from outside through federation that was not in the political vocabulary of Eritrean and Ethiopian in particular (Abdulkader, 2013; Tekeste, 1997; Yosief, 2013), and the colonized Africans in general. And hence, the federal concept, at least, it was not in the process -of- becoming in the continent of colonized states, at worst it was non-existing and alien to the recipients.

The United Nations (UN) imposed a quasi- federal liberal democratic constitution, the first internationally tailored inclusive constitution on Africa soil, on Eritrea². The federation was not, therefore, among the first, second and third options of real actors to the contemporary conflict, but none to all. The paradox was therefore Eritrea was entered into a federal marriage with a state of absolute monarchial political system which inherently antithesis to federal democratic culture. The Eritreans were, based on federal prescription, to accept the state and its leader which they labeled as “backward, feudal, uncivilized, primitive, archaic, and inferior” (Yosief, 2013) as their sovereign leader, one hand, Emperor Haile Selassie was awaited to accept and implement a federal democratic constitution on Eritrea which was ahistorical and apolitical to the organic foundation. The prevailing paradoxes and impracticalities of the federation were well summarized by Yosief Gebrehiwot’s article entitled “*Eritrea: the Federal Arrangement Farce*” under subtopic “*You cannot give what you don’t have*”:

“The farcical element in this deal can be teased out by asking this question: How was it possible for Imperial Ethiopia to let Eritrea have a federal system (and the democratic system that necessarily went with it) while it had none for itself? How was it possible for it to give what it didn’t possess? How was it possible for an absolute monarchy to accommodate an island of democratic enclave within its imperial domain? Anybody that entertained such an idea to begin with was either immensely naive or criminally irresponsible. While the former describes the state of mind of many Eritrean elite who have made that annulment their battle cry for half a

century (especially the nationalist historians), the latter description fits well the UN. Even as the UN architects knew that the federal arrangement under such a condition was unsustainable, they failed to come up with any other formula because they were anxious to get rid of the Eritrean problem from their hands as soon as possible” (December, 2013 retrieved from <http://awate.com/eritrea-the-federal-arrangement-farce/comment-page-2/>).

The federal -middle way solution- was therefore the result of Eritrean failure to provide convincing reasons to the international community, at least to the major powers of the time, that Eritrean question was colonial and its solution would be decolonization like all other colonies, and inclusive that Eritreanism was colonial creation, its people were commonly oppressed/colonized, and hence aspired to invent or imagine a collective independence or autonomy of colonially suffered people of Eritrea.

Moreover, the federation was result of international politico-legal processes of two major commissions established with a stated objective of “to gather information and to elicit the desires and wishes of the people in regard to the country’s future” (Abdulkader, 2013): *Four power commission and five member nation commission* in 1947 and 1949, respectively.

The first commission failed to provide solution, and it transferred the case to the United Nations General Assembly in 1949. The United Nations then sent a commission composed of five member nations (Burma, Guatemala, Norway, Pakistan and South Africa) to Eritrea in order to gather information and to elicit the desires and wishes of the people in regard to the country’s future. The mission, who stayed in Eritrea for two months (from 9 February to 9 April 1950) also failed to reach a common agreement to be presented to the General Assembly. Thus, the “General Assembly had to cast its vote over four proposals: First, Eritrea to be annexed to Ethiopia; second, Eritrea to be given independence status; third, the establishment of a trusteeship of the UN under Italian administration or another Western power; fourth, the partition of the territory between Ethiopia and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan” (Abdulkader, 2013).

The members of the UN commission did not come with a single conclusion. The delegates of Norway, Burma and South Africa proposed that “Eritrea should be a self-governing unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown” (Abdulkader, 2013), while the Pakistani and Guatemalan delegations argued “that due to the large Muslim population and the important Italian minority, Eritrea should first become independent under a Council of Trustees and should decide about its future after a period of ten years” (Ibid: 1394).

The United Nations General Assembly with support of the USA, France and the Soviet Union adopted the majority suggestion of the Commission in 1952 while British supported the partition plan of Eritrea in to Sudan and Ethiopia, as follows, “Muslim tribal areas adjoining to

²the 1952UN Federal Constitution on Eritrea titled “*Shaping a People’s Destiny: the Story of Eritrea and the United Nations*” published by United Nations Department of Public Information

the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan should be included in that country. The central Christian highlands with the port of Massawa and the Semhar and the Saho tribes should form part of a united Tigray state or province (...). The Danakil country with Assab should be assigned unconditionally to the Emperor" (Abdulkader, 2013).

The British position was based on the recommendation of Longrigg (1945:3), British military administrator of Eritrea, contended that Eritrea possesses "none of the qualities of geographical or cultural singleness which should entitle it to be a unit of territory or of government". And that "had the Italians not colonized Eritrea, which Eritrea would be partly, as always before, the ill-governed or non-governed northernmost province of Ethiopia" (*Ibid*). He further asserted that Eritreans were more resemble with Sudanese and Ethiopian counterparts than each other's. This idea also shared by Mensour (2002) in discussing the post-1946 intra-Eritrean divisions in framing the future Eritrea as "...the historical and cultural bondage of most Eritrean Abyssinians with the other part of historical Abyssinia was still strong. Sixty years of different socio-economic transformations had not been enough to cut or weaken the umbilical cord".

One major result of the federation, however, was the internationalization of the Eritrean crisis of identity formation, on one hand, and elevation of Eritrean consciousness as the federation gave them an autonomous status that had never been achieved before (Meressa, 2013, 2010). The federation also recognized that the existential bipolar natures of the Muslim/Christian, lowland /highland division of Eritrean politics which was reflected through equal representations of Muslim and Christian in the parliament and other governance structures.

More importantly, Arabic and Tigrigna were entitled equal official language status, and still remain as symbols of inclusion or exclusion (*Ibid*).

Militant Identity invention and territorial Independence

There is no common ground on the basic causes of the Eritrean armed liberation struggle that lasted for three decades. This part will assess the basic reasons that led the Eritreans to armed struggle, the characteristic features of militant nationalism, and finally to make a nexus on how the liberation based identity formation affected the post-independence Eritrean national security.

Following the consistent incursion of the Ethiopian government and the observable weakness of the federation, the Eritreans began to establish an underground cell called "Haraka al-Tahrir al-Eritrea" (Arabic for 'Party of seven member') or "Mahber Shewuata" in 1958 that evolved into Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) to pursue its goals "politically and diplomatically" (Tekeste, 1997). The major purpose of the ELM was "protecting the collapse of the federation, and its

members were composed of both Muslims and Christians who had sympathy for the federation" (*Ibid*).

When the Emperor abrogated the federal arrangement in 1962, many Christian Eritreans, just like their Muslim counterparts, felt that the regime was acting against their core interests as a form of colonial subjugation which was not different than from that of Italian or British colonialism (Sherman, 1980).

According to Gebru (2009), Mesfine (1988), and Tekeste (1987, 1997), Eritrean nationalism was based on grievances as a reaction to the enduring character of the Ethiopian state that caused the loss of Eritrea's regional autonomy. Sherman (1980) also argued that the Eritrean grievances towards the Ethiopian state was traced back to the 19th century Italo-Ethiopian agreements and war including Wuchale treaty 1889, battle of Adwa 1896, and Addis Ababa treaty 1896, and culminated in the abrogation of the federation as well as the subsequent harsh treatments of Eritreans by the Ethiopian governments.

After a failed two decade, post-colonial, search for an all-Eritrean identity formation and destiny determination, international community's effort to provide a lasting solution to the Eritrean problem, and the failure of emperor Haile Selassie either to maintain the federation until the unionist group got hegemony or convince the secessionist groups that the emperor and Ethiopian state was not anti-Islamist as it was stated, the lowland Eritrean started one of the longest armed struggle in Africa to invent a militant nationalist identity, that was not the case of Eritrean history of resistance before, in September 1, 1961 at Barka, by Idris Awate.

Eritrean liberation front, Islamic nationalism, and the future of Eritrea

The armed struggle for independence started in 1961 by Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) on the eve of the abrogation of the federation 1962. It was the continuation of the Muslim dissatisfaction with the federation because they used it as transitional instrument to their stated end; *independence*. The abrogation of the federation was thus pretext and indeed did not mobilize all Eritreans including the larger segments of Christian highlanders who lately joined it due to the failures of Ethiopian government to peacefully contain the highlanders (Mesfine, 1988).

The ELF, however, was criticized for its layering of Islamic nationalism over colonial thought while all Christian and Muslim Eritreans share the history of commonly colonized people. According to Akinola (2007), "the ELF lacked a clear ideological line and a political program that could safeguard the interests of the oppressed majority of Eritreans".

Instead, "through its organizational structure and its style of work the ELF fostered religious antagonism, and fanned backward differences and sentiments, of a regional and ethnic nature" (*Ibid*). This indeed negatively contributed

to the civil war and to the post independent “mutually exclusive and apolitical” Eritrean system (*Ibid*: 50).

In its ideology orientation, ELF was “pan-Arabism-Muslim revolutionary movement fighting to free Eritrea’s Muslims from persecution and domination by the local Christian population” (Saideman et al., 2005). According to the ELF’s National Revolutionary Vanguard of the Eritrean people posted in 1978 cited in Sherman (1980), the ELF’s relation with the Arab nations was:

... not an emotional or superficial, but militant, organic, historical, and cultural one based on bonds of the joint destiny, mutual and common interests, and solidarity in the face of menace and aggression.... The liberation of the Eritrean people is interrelated to the security of Arab nation.

The layering of Muslim communal identity over territorial identity secured for the ELF much-needed outside assistance from radical Arab states such as Syria, Libya, South Yemen, and Iraq—assistance that strengthened both internal and external perceptions of the group as an Arab-Islamic organization (*Ibid*). To the extent ELF declared its revolution as “the strike of the red Arab revolution in the black continent” (*Ibid*).

In its internal affairs, the ELF relied on the petty bourgeoisie orientation, and rejected the notion of a working-class vanguard (*Ibid*). Second difference was on the issue of “self-reliance”. The ELF has always relied on external material support. It strongly contended that a colonial and semi colonial nation “could not solve their internal and external problems on their own by following the principle of self-reliance” which is one of the EPLF’s unique rule (*Ibid*). The third differences was the economic orientation of the revolution. While EPLF was committed to a socialist path, the ELF has advocated a “non-capitalist road to development”. The ELF believed that the Eritrean society being part of the third world has to follow the non-capitalist road to development following opportunistic alliances with the capitalist and non-capitalist states (*Ibid*).

Generally, the sectarian policy of ELF and divisions within it based on religion, region and personal interests not only led to civil wars that ultimately drove out ELF from the armed struggle, but also aborted the democratic political culture of the liberation struggle (Gebru, 2009) and this also negatively affected the subsequent struggle to be controlled, mobilized and strongly xenophobic to democratic differences within the parties.

Eritrean people’s liberation front and territorial nationalism

Saideman et al. (2005) defined territorial nationalism as “a bond based on common residence within a particular region that is distinct from the core”. He further argued that “homeland identity is significant because

secessionists need first and foremost a territory they can claim as their own before they can legitimately call for territorial self-determination (*Ibid*). Establishing a territorial base is probably the most important strategic consideration for a movement’s organizer in order to distinguish itself from the host state and legitimize the “self” in need of “determination” in the eyes of both domestic and international audiences (*Ibid*).

In the selection of identity base for liberation struggle, Saideman underlined the importance of the ethnic compositions of the claimed territory. Accordingly, “if the territory is dominated by a single ethnic group, a salient territorial identity is less important for obtaining the support of its inhabitants” (*Ibid*: 29). This is particularly true of irredentist groups. For them, it is less important to establish a separate territorial identity than it is to establish a communal linkage with their homeland. Conversely, “if the territory is ethnically heterogeneous, a salient territorial identity is absolutely vital” (*Ibid*).

The EPLF was realistic in out maneuvering its predecessor by redefining the territorial conception of Eritrean nationalism over the communal (sectarian) conception of the ELF. Following the internal leadership crisis of ELF it was clear that sectarian based liberation struggle could not fit to define the objective causes of the Eritrean problems (Antonio, 2002). Indeed, the crisis paved the way to the emergence of new non-sectarian liberation front (EPLF) and re-conception of Eritrean nationalism based on territorial identity of the commonly colonized Eritrean people (Connell, 2001; Saideman et al, 2005).

The EPLF ultimately prevailed over the ELF for several interrelated reasons. *First*, the EPLF, in its 1971 manifesto “Our Struggle and Its Goals” (Nehnan, 1971), rejected the ELF’s communal identification, and self-consciously propagated a nonsectarian, territorial Eritrean identity that could accommodate everyone who supported independence (Connell, 2001 and 2005). As a result, EPLF abandoned the divisive zonal system, adopting a single command structure that reflected its emphasis on building national unity (Saideman et al., 2005; Sherman, 1980).

Second, the EPLF had layered an ideological identity onto its territorial identity. Its leadership was committed to social revolution as part of the liberation struggle, and it adopted a selective, pragmatic Marxist philosophy of conducting “revolution before unity”-emphasizing the principle of uncompromising struggle against Ethiopian state (Henze, 1985).

To this end, EPLF in its national democratic revolution of 1977 “calls for the establishment of a solid worker – peasant alliance and the formation of a broad National United Front under the firm leadership of a proletariat party that can successfully rally all patriotic elements against the common enemy of colonial aggression” (Sherman, 1980). Its lack of outside assistance and the negative implications of aid to the ELF’s crisis due to the

divisive conditionality of the Arab supports gave rise to the EPLF's emphasis on self-reliance in all aspects including political, military, and economy and inward-oriented development, that still remains the unique feature of the post-independent government of Eritrea (*Ibid*).

With regard to the evolution of EPLF's colonial thesis based territorial nationalism, there are still contending views, on one hand there are groups who argued that Eritrean identity as pre-existing realities that traces back to Axumit civilization (Bereket, 2010). On the other hand, groups included (Akinola, 2007; Clapham, 2000; Gebru, 2009; Mesfine, 1988; Tekeste, 1997) argued that Eritrean nationalism is a post-1960s phenomenon. Accordingly, Eritrean nationalism is neither the European type, i.e. nation as pre-requisite for statehood, nor African type based on common resistance to colonialism which was non-existent in colonial history of Eritrean. The second group contended that Eritrean nationalism not colonial but grievance based nationalism aggravated by consistent failures and crisis, and repressive means of the Ethiopian state.

In dating the origin of Eritrean nationalism, Mesfine denounced the pre-existing Eritrean nationalism, and claimed as of the post-1974 basically due to the Ethiopian revolution and its failure to manage the Eritrean problems. the growing influence of Christian elements in the field increased to unprecedented pace only after the Dergue regime's major military offensives including urban terror against Eritrean youth had a transformative quality on the Eritrean nationalist politics (Mesfine, 1988).

Cognizant of this, the EPLF effectively utilized the party's democratic centralism modeled on the Chinese Maoist principle. According to Mesfine (1988), in its mobilization and galvanization of the Eritrean people into a uniform, disciple, mobilized people who rally around a common cause; independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia, the EPLF "engaged in controlled social reforms from above in areas of land reform and gender issues". More importantly, through its internal security mechanism - "Halawa Sewura"³, "- Defender of the Revolution - EPLF was able to create a hierarchical and disciplined military organization of formidable historical significance.

The EPLF's effective mobilization of the Eritrean people to stick to the established cause was better summarized by Gebru (2009:65) as:

The techniques of organization, mobilization, propaganda, and combat were all based on Mao's principles of protracted revolutionary war. The Eritrean revolutionaries invented nothing, but they were excellent improvisers.... The EPLF organized its members and supporters vertically and horizontally, its vertical set up involved the regular and irregular fighters, and it stretched down ward through several levels to the villages, where the cadres created zonal administration and mass association to support the Eritrean People's Liberation Army (EPLA).

³ Tigrigna for EPLF's Intelligence organization, Defender of the Revolution

The party used to mobilize and organize the people through "combinations of promises, mostly land reform and focused on terror" (*Ibid*). Connell (2005) also argued that the repressive, secretive and arbitrary exercise of absolute power to make everyone in line with the discipline, traced back to the 1970s and 1980s. From that time onwards the EPLF was organized and led from within by a clandestine, Marxist core, chaired by Isaias Afwerki and strongly influenced by contemporary Maoist political currents – the Eritrean People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP).

Connell (2005) argument further strengthened by Gebru (2006) that EPLF "was more tightly and rigidly organized than its predecessor and used two techniques to ensure conformity, discipline and order: the first one criticism and self-criticism locally known as "gimgema", and the second instrument was coercion implemented by the "Halawa Sewura"-Defender of the Revolution" (*Ibid*: 66-67).

According to the first instrument, the party made sure that its fighters are discipline requesting them correct their defects via self-criticism if not get them criticized by other members. According to Gebru (2006), the 'gimgema'⁴ an instrument of control to "prevent mistakes, and cultivate openness, trust and comradeship", on one hand, it encourages "secrecy, hypocrisy, insincerity, self-censorship, and docility for fear of ridicule and humiliation in public sessions" on the other hand (*Ibid*: 66).

The second instrument was: 'coercion' implemented by the so called "Halawa Sewura" (*Ibid*: 67). The very function of the Halawa Sewura was "to protect the revolution from internal subversion and external infiltration" (*Ibid*), and it used written and unwritten codes to intimidate the targets so as to make them in line with the discipline. The most common instruments utilized by the party were "isolations and public humiliation" (*Ibid*). The degree of punishment varies from "mild warning, counseling, or reprimand to imprisonment in undisclosed isolated locations or hard labor including digging salt on the Red sea coast. The fate of the more defiant or unrepentant could be torture or liquidation" (*Ibid*).

However, such repressive controlling mechanisms were not only used to punish the ordinary fighters, EPLF like its predecessor used merciless mechanism to eliminate political and military figures who were considered to challenge to the ruling clique in particular and the party in general. The most noticed mechanism was known as "the Menkae"⁵ movement" -opposing group to the ruling clique came from the educated fighters who criticized the EPLF

⁴ Tigrigna for Criticism and Self-criticism

⁵After the Tigrinya word for bat, and derived from the opposition's habit of mobilizing support through discussions and propaganda conducted with fighters at night (Pool, 1990:76). On every occasion, in every valley and hill-top, at the highest pitch of their voices they began spreading news that there was no democracy and the rights of the freedom fighters were violated (*Ibid*).According to Medhanie cited in Mekonen (2008:42), in the Eritrean Tigrinya/highland tradition, a bat symbolizes dishonesty. Remarkably, the Tigrinya word 'menkae' also stands for 'left,' denoting at the same time left wing conservatism.

leadership as backward and strived for scientific socialism as opposed to a national democratic revolution (Connell, 2005; Pool, 1990).

The challenge to the EPLF's controlled and undemocratic nature by the menkae resulted in summary execution of all members of the menkae movement in the mid-1970s, and the establishment of the Halawa Sewura – as defender of the revolution from internal division and external incursion (Mekonen, 2008). The repression of the menkae movement was also followed by the suppression of another opposition group from within the EPLF, known as the “Yemin” or rightist opposition” (*Ibid*: 44), with feudalist and regionalist tendencies.

All the aforementioned structural traumas of intra-Eritrean conflicts and the subsequent repressive mechanism of eliminating opponent groups used by the liberation movements had resulted in, on one hand, the politics of exclusion and monopolization that turned the liberation war to be undemocratic which in turn has negative implications to the post-independent nation-building project. On the other hand, the recurrent pre- and post-independence Eritrean problems indicated that Eritrean nationalism was not established by an all-inclusive Eritrean consensus and agreements from the very beginning.

Externally, the EPLF's nationalism was based on grievances (Medhane, 1999) and establishment of an ever existing significant enmity of Ethiopia in particular, the international community in general. With regard to Ethiopia, EPLF defined it as an African colonizer (imperialist) (Nehnan, 1971). The grievance based nationalism against Ethiopian was framed, first, by denouncing Eritrea-Ethiopian ties: in the Nehnan (1971). Eritrea was defined as a separate unit politically, economically, socially and historically created by Italian colonialism.

Second, it considered Eritreans as betrayed people (Sherman, 1980) by Ethiopia due to Menelik's agreement with Italy from Wuchale to Addis Ababa treaties; the abrogation of the federation (1952 to 62); and the repressive military solutions of the Dergue regime. The failures of the Ethiopian governments further supported the nationalist movements to rally the Eritrean people against Ethiopian state. However, the grievance based nationalism has negative implication to the future Eritrean state, that is, the continuity of Eritrean nationalism and state always depend on either weak Ethiopian state, or strong but undemocratic state towards the Eritrean (Meressa, 2010).

In addition to the Ethiopian factor, the EPLF developed a xenophobic attitude towards the international community by inventing the doctrine of self-reliance. The policy of self-reliance stated that the support from international community has negative and divisive role to the Eritrean nationalism. EPLF also viewed the international community as betraying the Eritrean people at different historical realities in supporting the Ethiopian state following the Italian colonialism by imposing federation, the failure of the OAU and great powers to

prevent Haile Selassie's abrogation of the federation and to support their national armed liberation struggle. Therefore, the continuity of the intra-Eritrean relations and their national security is strongly based on the activities of external actors.

Beyond territorial independence: One People-one heart, post-colonial african nation-building syndrome

Robert Kaplan in the April 2003 Atlantic Monthly edition entitled “a Tale of Two Colonies” characterized Eritrea as “the newly independent, sleepily calm, and remarkably stable state”. He further argued that the country has achieved “a degree of non-coercive social discipline and efficiency enviable in the developing world and particularly in Africa”.

According to Kaplan Eritrea has achieved such a non-coercive social function “by ignoring the West's advice on democracy and development, by cultivating a sometimes obsessive and narcissistic dislike of its neighbors, and by not demobilizing its vast army, built up during a thirty-year conflict with Ethiopia...” (*Ibid*). Hence, Eritrea's clarified sense of nationhood is rare in a world of nation-states rent by tribalism and globalization (*Ibid*). However, Kaplan in the same edition put an opposite statement of President Isaias on the existing realities of Eritrea “...we have not yet institutionalized social discipline, so the possibility of chaos is still here. Remember, we have nine language groups and two religions...therefore we will have to manage the creation of political parties, so that they don't become means of religious and ethnic division, like in Ivory Coast or Nigeria” (*Ibid*).

The post-independence Eritrean nation-building is the continuity of the EPLF's controlled national mobilization of the armed struggle. The armed struggle that lasted three decades was effective in mobilizing all Eritreans all over the world, to use Kaplan's description as “an almost Maoist degree of mobilization and an almost Albanian degree of xenophobia” (2003:13), either willingly convinced by the stated cause: liberation of Eritrea, or coerced through the security apparatus of the EPLF mainly the Halawa Sewura (Gebru, 2009). The Eritrean people therefore made a remarkable history in rallying and supporting the armed struggle under the principle “Hade Hizbi-Hade Libi” (one-people, one heart), and finally achieved their “*first vision: independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia*” (Berhane, 2006).

The unity that was demonstrated during the armed struggle to achieve the first vision was also expected and made to be the pillar in achieving the “*Second Vision; to radically transform Eritrea to the Singapore of Africa*” (*Ibid*). The success of the second vision was stated to base on “national unity and self-reliance” as stated in the preamble of the unimplemented Eritrean constitution of 1997 while ‘sub national identity’ that promote any specific ethnicity and /or religion were strongly condemned (*Ibid*: 34).

Bereket (2010) and Kaplan (2003) argued that the post-independent nation building was an outgrowing of the liberation conception of Eritrean nationalism as “the ‘melting pot’ that united the disparate groups making up the nation and mobilized them against an alien occupying army, eventually leading to the country’s independence” through the process of “social engineering” (Berhane, 2006) of the multi ethnic Eritrean people.

However, the post-independence nation- building policy from above under the principle of ‘one people, one heart’ was criticized and considered challenging to the new state of Eritrea to consolidate a single national identity being none of the Eritrean ethnic groups are unique to it but rather Eritrea is characterized by an all-round trans-border community ties (Berhane, 2006; Ibrahim, 2010) which in turn makes Eritrea an all-round “part nation state”. This further indicated that the nation-building process not only depended on war induced unity but also on the acts of Eritrea’s significant other (Ethiopia and Sudan) as one defining feature of nation-state of becoming (Gebru, 2006; Medhane, 1999). An attempt to build a single national identity out of an all-round trans-border community ties, therefore, forced the government of Eritrea to frame contradictory policies which resulted in conflictual relationship with its neighbours.

According to Gebru (2006) Eritrea’s conflictual relations with its neighbours emanated basically from the aspirations of the leadership to forge a single Eritrean national identity within a short period of time taking the triumphant militant nationalism and the war induced mobilization leaping over the arduous and protracted paths of state formation neglecting the pre-independence identity conflicts among Eritreans. Gebru (2006) argument on the difficult nature of nation-building and the ambitious project of the new state Eritrean is further supported by Bundegaard’s statement as:

The Eritrean leadership has increasingly found itself in the hot water of state-making and nation-building “in a hurry”. While state sovereignty may be attained under dramatic circumstances, played out on the stage of world history, the craft of state-making and nation-building is often of a less heroic and even dull, bureaucratic nature (2004).

Gebru (2006) further went on to substantiate his argument that the leadership strategy was “conflicting and self-defeating, that is, fanning conflicts with neighbouring states in order to forge a strong Eritrean identity ,and tapping the resources and markets of neighbouring countries with the aim of achieving miraculous economic development strategies”(*Ibid*:11). This policy was aggravated by “the making Eritrean and nurturing Eritreanness as it demands self- definition and boundary delimitation which is inherently contrasts and needs relevant other” (*Ibid*: 57).

In line with the arguments, Berhane (2006) argued that the reason for the conflictual policies of the government of Eritrea was to differentiate Eritrea’s ethnic groups from

their counterparts in the neighbouring countries by involving them in wars to sever the ethnic ties with Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan ,and Yemen and ultimately to promote national unity.

Moreover, the ideal of nation-building from above is also contested and considered as an ambitious policy failing to grasp the internal objective realities of Eritrean social makeup, geopolitical, religious, and emotional values and differences (Amanuel, 2010) that has been developed through different historical realities(*Ibid*; Ibrahim, 2010).

Moreover, the continuation of the war induced militant policy to the peace time nation building is viewed as unrealistic and exclusionist as it failed to reconcile the pre-independence Eritrean divisions and consequence of the civil wars .The nation building policy thus resulted in the “proliferation of ‘loser complexes’ (Mekonen, 2008) and “mistrust” (Amanuel, 2010) among non-EPLF nationalists.

The growing politics of exclusion between the highlands and lowlands, Christian and Muslim Eritreans became visible and burning issues to delegitimize the principle of one-people, one heart following the Ethiopia -Eritrean war of 1998 to 2000. Moreover, the war ended up the hopes for political inclusion, reconciliation and multi-partism when the government declared national security as paramount priority (Yemane Gebremeskel in an interview with IRIN, 2004).

Connell (2003) characterized the postwar trajectory of Eritrea as familiar to “crisis of the postcolonial African state and the corruption of the political process” defined by the concentration of power within the executive branch of government, the marginalization of nominally independent parliaments and judiciaries, the imprisonment or exile of vocal critics, the sharp restriction of independent media and autonomous civil society institutions, the outlawing of rival political parties. The war therefore revitalized the historical division as a means to pressure and voices their grievances against political exclusion and injustices particularly by the Muslim lowlanders.

The Muslim lowlanders were also frustrated by post-independent political developments and constitutional making process, though it remains unimplemented, particularly their concern on the failure of the constitution to incorporate Arabic as an official language which is considered not only as medium communication but also symbol of liberation and political inclusion (Ibrahim, 2010; Mensour, 2010).

The Muslim also negatively responded to the replacement of ethno- religious territorial administrative identities of the pre-1991 that reflects the collective identity of the people for generations by the new geographic administration into northern, southern, western, eastern and central administrative units as part of the nation-building from above (Amanuel, 2010). The government explained the abolition of the historic names as part of the new nation building policy to defuse the ethnic and sub-regional sentiments (Bereket, 2010).

The Muslims however viewed the new geographic

division as part of the continuous incursion and eventual confiscation of their historical land by the highlanders in the name of resettlement (Amanuel, 2009; Ibrahim, 2010; Mensour, 2002). They further contend that the program of forcible settlement of highlanders in the lowlands is part of a long-term strategy of a massive resettlement of highlanders under the policy of demographic engineering on lands that should be reserved for lowlanders (Bereket, 2010; Tekeste, 1997).

In response to those historically evolved grievances and sense of exclusion, the Muslim lowlanders tend to negate the existing state of Eritrea (*Hadas Eritrea-new Eritrea*) and the principle of 'one-people, one-heart' as a cover-up to the legitimization of the Christian highlander domination. Amanuel (2010) provided popular proverbs of the lowlanders used to express their dissatisfaction with the post independent state of Eritrea:

"I am not seeing my image in the mirror of Hadas Eritrea".

In addition to this, there is also another proverb that indicate the extent of political exclusion and lowlanders attitude towards the national currency (*Nakfa*⁶) and the recognition of the camel on the currency as symbols of resistance: "the camel is in and the owner is out" (*Ibid*).

Even though the lowlanders expressed their grievances and viewed the state of Eritrea as dominated by the Christian highlanders, the later groups are not to accept the concerns of the former. The highlanders too are frustrating by the government's repressive measures mainly following the Ethiopia-Eritrean war and they defend the accusation of the lowlanders -that the state of Eritrea is Christian and the government is pro-Christian, being the government is becoming power of injustice for all (Bereket, 2010).

Leadership behavior and the emergence of police state

The current institutional decadence and totalitarian governance in Eritrea can be viewed as part and parcel of Eritrea's long march to independence and the way the nationalist conception and liberation struggle was framed. According to Tronvoll (2009) the 'seeds of dictatorship' in Eritrea were sown already at the embryonic stage of the EPLF when it faced an internal dissent movement from the leftist intelligential groups known as *menkae*. The internal rift later resulted in the elimination of the *menkae* accusing them of "individualism", "subjectism", and "destructive ultra-leftism" (Gebru, 2009).

⁶ Nakfa is the military and political base of the EPLF during the armed struggle. It is known in the history of Eritrean liberation struggle as symbol of resistance, heroism, determination of the Eritrean guerrilla fighters in their struggle against the Dergue regime of Ethiopia. It was the stronghold of EPLF where they defeat the Dergue's an all-inclusive military campaign known as "the red star campaign" in cooperation with the TPLF. The Eritrean national currency thus named after the place Nakfa.

According to Gebru (2009), the emergence and the elimination of the *menkae* subsequently exacerbated the politics of mistrust and fear, and aborted the political culture of rational dialogue and compromise (*Ibid*). Indeed he further argued that "the incidents have inaugurated instead a political culture of coerced consensus clocked in the trappings of national salvation and laid the foundation of cultism surrounding the much vaunted charisma of Isaias" (*Ibid*). The ultimate result was thus the instrumentalization of violence and arbitrary detention without due process as major means of dealing with internal dissent (Tronvoll, 2009).

Externally, the post-independence Eritrean leadership has been increasingly preoccupied with nation-building strategies to make Eritrea as Tiger of the Horn of Africa within a short period of time guided by the traditional principle of "war makes state" (Tilly, 1985) as Eritrea was the only example in post-colonial Africa that established through protracted war (Clapham, 2000).

Being Eritrea was to face Ayoob's Security Predicament of the Third world state of "late entry to the state-making project, and the simultaneous and contingent natures of the nation-building" (1995) with its neighbours, the leadership framed the nation-building strategies from above under the principle of "*Hade-Hizbi, Hade-Libi*" to continuously project the war induced mobilization through securitization of every sector, over-politicization of the nation-building and militarization of the young generation through national service (Bundegaard, 2004) which is too big and expensive for a war-torn small and young state of Eritrea .

National service and militarization of national security

The national military service, as one major component of nation-building, was introduced with the objectives as stated in the 1995 National Service Proclamation of Article5:

to establish of a strong defense force ;to preserve and entrust future generations the courage, resoluteness heroic episodes shown, in the armed struggle by our people in the past thirty years; to create a new generation characterized by love of work, discipline, ready to participate and serve in reconstruction of the nation; to develop and enforce the economy of the nation by investing in development work our people as a potential wealth; to develop professional capacity and physical fitness by giving regular military training and continuous practice to participants in training Centers; and to foster national unity among our people by eliminating sub-national feelings.

Taking into account that the state of Eritrea was born out of war, the national military service was primary aimed at ensuring the inter-generation transition between'

Yika'alo⁷ and 'Warsay'⁸ which in turn to accelerate the "Eritreanization of the nation building" (Connell, 2001) to fit the founding pillar of self-reliance similar to the armed struggle so that indoctrination and militarization of the new generation under the revolutionary slogan:

"An army without a revolutionary ideology is like a man without a brain. An army without a brain can never defeat the enemy" (*Ibid*).

According to national service proclamation of 1995, thus all Eritrean citizens aged 18 to 40 have the duty to fulfill the "Active National Service" of six month regular military training given at a base and the participation to a twelve consecutive months of active national service and development programs under the Army Forces for a total service of 18 months (Chapter- II, article 8).

In post-independent Eritrea, *Sawa*, the center of post-independence Eritrea's military training, is considered as the symbol of inter-generation transition (between Yikaalo and Warsay), nation-building and melting pot of collective identity of the existing diversity to the new generation-Warsay; as *Nakfa*-revolutionary base of armed struggle, was the symbol of resistance, heroism, protracted war and independence accomplished by the old generation-Yikaalo. The end result of the militarization and securitization was therefore a huge military buildup and militarization (both in human and material).

The militarization together with the longest protracted liberation war aggravated the superiority and the invincibility of the Eritrean army. This indeed contributed to conflictual policy towards all its neighbors based on border, religion, economy as well as its hegemonic and leadership tendency in the region. According to this study, Eritrea's all round conflicts with its neighbours seems to test the success of military indoctrination and transition to the new generation -Warsay under the supervision of the old generation-Yikaalo ultimately to redefine the Horn of Africa's power structure in particular ,and Africa in general.

According to Connell (2001) "the Eritrean leadership was obsessed with the problems of miscalculations about their reputation they had cultivated for years of being the best fighting forces in Africa as they were the longest guerrilla fighters". In the post independent period they persisted in their belief of having disciplined military that can easily bully the neighbouring countries, and therefore could be changed into economic power (Clapham, 2000; Connell, 2003; Gebru, 2009; Gebru, 2006).

Eritrea 's last war; Ethiopia-Eritrea war 1998 to 2000, however, resulted in a negative repercussions to its national security as it signified the failure of the

invincibility of the Eritrean army, the inter-generation transition, and negative implications to the historical intra-Eritrean divisive factors. Furthermore , the war forced the leadership to redefine new policies: internally the government issued national emergency with tight control in order to contain internal problems signaling that the state would be swallowed by its neighbours mainly Ethiopia; externally the state also engaged in proxy wars in order to contain the internal challenges, and to maintain its external power balance.

Even if the Eritrea's direct war making capacity is deterred, it continues to engage in proxy wars by supporting Islamic groups in order to contain the internal divisive factors and to continue regional power projection. However, this further aggravated Eritrea's isolation from regional and international actors.

Post-Ethiopia-Eritrea war: National security in structural crisis

Kaplan (2003) in his comparative analysis of Yemen and Eritrea argued that "Eritrea has achieved a degree of non-coercive social function by ignoring the West's advice on democracy and development, by cultivating a sometimes obsessive and narcissistic dislike of its neighbors, and by not demobilizing its vast army, built up during a thirty-year conflict with Ethiopia..., hence,...Eritrea's clarified sense of nationhood is rare in a world of nation-states rent by tribalism and globalization (*Ibid*).

Conversely, Connell (2003) characterized the trajectory of the post-independent Eritrean state as a familiar path of the "crisis of the postcolonial African state" and concluded that "the corruption of the political process ...a giant step backward for the objectives, the values, and the vision...Eritrea was (and remains) a contradictory reality..."

There is a common agreement that Eritrean national security and the leadership acting behaviour was radically relapsed to one of the most totalitarian state following the Ethiopia-Eritrean war of 1998to 2000.The worst impact of the war was the erosion of leadership legitimacy and invincibility of President Isaias from with the party and the critical Eritrean mass, particularly from the top political figures and the academician. The first criticism to the President's leadership inability came from the intellectuals known as "the G-13" and their petition manifesto known as "the Berlin-Manifesto" (Bereket, 2010).

In the first part of the petition entitled "a hard-Won independence was nearly lost" (2000) criticised the conduct of state both domestic and foreign affairs, and about the nature and style of the leadership in the post-independence period.The manifesto also criticized the policy of self-reliance as senseless arrogance. Finally they expressed their frustrations on the concentration of power in the hand of the President and the eventual one-man leadership.

⁷ Tigrigna for "able". It refers to the guerrilla generation of Eritrea who achieved the first Eritrean vision: independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia. It mainly refers to the EPLF fighters. It is also called "the Nakfa" generation.

⁸ Tigrigna for "heir" .It refers to the post-independence Eritrean generation who is expected to ensure the second Eritrean vision: making Eritrea the Singapore of Africa. It is also called "the Sawa" generation.

The Ethiopia-Eritrea war ended-up Eritrea's military invincibility and weakened the leadership's arrogance of power projection and instigating instability against its neighbours. Economically, the war ended up Eritrea's vision of "*Singaporization*"- to "*be Horn of Africa Industrial Houses*" (Gebru, 2006). The port-based national economy (Massawa and Assab) lost its comparative and competitive advantage to Djibouti for decades to come, and the policy of "self-reliance" proved to be a structural failure to a poor war torn state in era globalization. Indeed, the war made Eritrea a contained and isolated state in era of global interdependence.

Since 1998 Eritrea government is at unwinnable hot and cold wars with its neighbours and international community, harboring proxy warriors via supporting terrorist groups like Al- Shabab. Torture and imprisonment of its citizens are aired as endemic identity of the regime; the critical young generation is either in the military trenches indefinitely or fleeing the state as a result it remains with under and over aged people, no constitution, no parliament, no judiciary, no election, no functioning institution (Yosief, 2013).

Eritrea is called the North Korea of Africa that makes it functionally 'failing' state to use Yosief Gebrehiwot expression that Eritrea is in the process of Somalization, hence potentially a "failed state" in the war hotbed region of the Horn of Africa. The process of Somalization of the Eritrean state is reaffirmed by President Isaias Afewerki in his New Year (January 1, 2015) address to nation that in the past fifteen years Eritrea was under national state of emergency due to the declared war from Ethiopia, and political and diplomatic sanction by the USA led UN security council as result Eritrean development is paralyzed, it loses its young labor forces due to the externally induced migration and the remaining citizens are forced to stay in military trenches indefinitely. In generally Eritrea is in "Hostage and freezing".

CONCLUSION

The young and small war born state of Eritrea is facing all-round national security predicaments from its inception. The national security crises are the results of complex historical evolutions and protracted conflicts both against external actors and among the Eritrean themselves. The national security crises are basically centered on the lack of agreed consensus among the Eritreans themselves on the idea of Eritrean state and the feature of Eritreanism. This is also related to the existential division of the people of Eritrea into highland/lowland, Christian/Muslim as the prior defining features of Eritrean politics. These divergent outlooks are the results of historical evolutions that traces back to the European colonialism, federation with Ethiopia and armed liberation struggle. The nature of national mobilization during the armed struggle has also its own contribution to the current challenges as it was based on both internal as

well as external enmity.

Moreover, the post-independence nation-building from above under the principle of "one people, one heart", which is the continuation of the armed struggle, also have grave challenge as it failed to integrate the existential realities of Eritrean multi-ethnic societies and their historical dichotomies. The nation-building strategy also failed to take into account the basic feature Eritrea's an all-round "part-nation-state". Hence its attempt to forge a single national identity through melting down diversity and erecting artificial borders with its neighbours through war encouraged by the invincibility of the guerrilla army based on the traditional national security principles "war makes state" and militarization as guarantees to defeat external threats strongly affected the very idea of national security. Hence, the conflictual relation with its neighbours and exclusionist internal policies ultimately results in grave national security crisis and emergence of totalitarian leadership and police state.

The post-2001 Eritrea is repeatedly viewed as North Korea of Africa: young and small state with arrogantly isolationist foreign policy that could not burden totalitarian police state, that the port-based national economy (Massawa and Assab) lost its comparative and competitive advantage to Djibouti for decades to come, and the policy of "self-reliance" proved to be a structural failure to a poor war torn state in era globalization, that the critical young generation is leaving the state and the remaining population is in a military uniform waiting for an imaginary enemy, that all the critical state institutions are decayed, the only state with no constitution, that the core security apparatus are in crisis that the regime is relying on forces recruited from neighbouring states, like Democratic Movement for Liberation of Tigray.

In general, Eritrea is in the process of becoming second Somalia in a region where fragile states is pervasive, and terrorism is becoming epidemic , and the neighboring states mainly Ethiopia should thus develop a road map to contain the worst case scenario: state collapse on the red sea.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

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Full Length Research Paper

The impact of federal-states intergovernmental relations on regional states autonomy in Ethiopian Federal System

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From its nature, federal system not only stands for the distribution of powers between federal and state governments, but also requests relations between the two in order to ensure coordination and effective achievements of powers and responsibility divided. Ethiopian Federal-States intergovernmental relations are dominated by the federal government and its executive institution because of ruling political party, existing political culture and absence of practical institution that manage and guide the relationships between the two orders of government which has influence on constitutionally given states autonomy. This article appraise the impact of federal-states intergovernmental relations on latter's autonomy based on data collected through interview from diversified groups of informants, were necessary and relating with existing conceptual frameworks. Using all these mechanisms, the result shows that, in Ethiopia, federal-states internally generated revenue (IGR) influences the constitutionally given state autonomy and the federal government and its executive institutions dominates the process of Ethiopian federal-state intergovernmental relations through the hands of TPLF/EPRDF ruling political party. Frankly speaking, unless the principles enshrined in the constitution changed to practice this, political crisis will disintegrate the future of Ethiopia. It is not federalism that brought this rather the system and failure of its practice as it demands full commitment.

Key words: States autonomy, Oromo, intergovernmental relations.

INTRODUCTION

As a result of conquests and expansion made by Menelik, modern Ethiopia was created and emerged as a unitary state in the closing years of the 19th century (Bahru 2001). Scholars note that in history, Ethiopia is characterized by diversity of language, culture and religion and never colonized differing to the rest of Africa

but, not an exception to the experience of creating a nation-state as most other countries has done. All diversities did not get recognition and only 'one nation, one language and one religion' was practical during both imperial and military regime. As a result of the culmination of national liberation movements, spearheaded

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by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (TPLF/EPRDF), the military dictatorship, called Derg, was overthrown on May 28, 1991. The defeats of the Derg paved the way and create the opportunity to undertake political, economical and constitutional transformation and to 'devolve power' (Hashim, 2010) along ethno-linguistic lines which gave an end to unitary and birth to federal system in Ethiopia. Since post-1991s, a policy of decentralization that divides power and responsibilities between the federal and states governments has been put in place. The constitution has declared a federal state containing nine regional states based on ethno-linguistic considerations with the aim to solve or prevent ethnic tensions¹ and two city administrations² with adequate power and authority to exercise their autonomy.

Federal-states intergovernmental relations have direct impact on the operation of the federal system and it is very important in understanding its operational part since it has the tendency to alter or entirely change constitutional division of power. Depending on the nature of the federation, federal-states Intergovernmental relation may be conducted on a cooperative, competitive, coercive and conflicting basis. When the federation is a decentralized one and is a coming together one, the tendency is towards competition and when it is a centralized and holding together one, the relationship takes the form of cooperation and the issue of autonomy comes to the scene at this point (Brunetta, 2009).

The links between the excessive cooperation between the two layers of governments will result centralized federalism (Merera, 2007). The constitutional grant of autonomy and power to the states can either be reduced or the federal through its institution and power may make them non-existent or invisible to describe. Thus, complexity is inherent and persistent features of intergovernmental relations and accomplishments of the federal-states intergovernmental relations objectives depend on the successful management of these complexities.

In Ethiopia, FDRE constitution (Art47/4) declares that all units of federation shall have equal rights and powers and Article (50/4) states that adequate power shall be granted to the lowest units of government to enable the people to participate directly in the administration of such unit. However, in the inevitable relations between the federal and states orders of government, the FDRE constitution has not adequately provided common forum of cooperation nor explicitly gives evidence how to

manage and shape the fundamental principle of co-existence between the two spheres. Hence, the relationships between the federal government and states as well as states and lower orders (levels) of government are not adequately and clearly defined in the constitution (Un-Habitat, 2002).

Institutionally, the key federal institution in federal-states intergovernmental relations has been the Office for Regional Affairs (ORA) within the prime minister office that later devolved to Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA) in 2001. The role of this ministry as an institution for co-ordination of federal-states relation is obviously stated under proclamation 471/2005.³ However, there is a critic that practically there is no institution for federal-states intergovernmental relations than the political party mechanism in Ethiopia (Assefa, 2013).

In federal-states intergovernmental relations, dominant homogeneous ruling party have impact on states autonomy, that the ruling party controls the institution of both federal and states either directly through its member parties or indirectly through joined parties that appear to be autonomous, but have strong links with the ruling party (Aalen, 2002). Through the standard of cooperation, the center influences the states and takes the whole federation under its control by adopting uniform party structure and policy making system. In such situations, state governments lose their autonomy based on their consent for cooperation or because of influence of the federal government and its institution which affects not only autonomy of states but also the federal system itself as it leads to centralized federalism in practice (William and Christian, 2006).

Putting in a simple word, there is no doubt that the states or ethno-national groups are recognized as the major actors (Hashim, 2010) in the federal system of Ethiopia based on the pages of the constitution; however the argument is based on their role and the authority to reflect their autonomous existence given constitutionally. Thus, the constitutional division of power in Ethiopia does not matter to maintain the federal system and the notion that the states are the superior actors in the Ethiopian federal system seems an argument from the constitutional eye, but the issue that remains unsettled is whether the states are in a position to use some of their powers that the constitution gives them freely without any implicit and explicit pressure from the center. In other words, in the absence of adequate constitutional provisions or legislation principles and practical institution of federal-states intergovernmental relations and existence of dominant ruling party, states autonomy in the cover of federal-states intergovernmental relations need practical assessment. On the other hand, intergovernmental relation cannot be stable if the ruling

¹ There are arguments for and against the Ethiopian federal arrangement in its potential and capability to resolve conflicts. EPRDF as ruling party argues that recognition of the rights of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples to self-determination and self-rule has resolved the long standing national question. Critics argue that it has not yet solved conflicts as it was hoped in the early 1990s and hasn't deterred political forces from demanding independence such as OLF and ONLF.

² The two cities are Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa that the latter is recognized by the Federal Proclamation.

³ Proclamation No. 471/2005 established to provide for the 'Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia', 12th year No.1, Addis Ababa, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 17th November 2005

party loses its position in states in the future. This is because if there are two different political parties in both the federal government and the states, there might be intergovernmental conflict in the existence of constitutional and institutional gaps.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

This section deals with the methodological considerations of data collection. The aim of this section is to ensure the validity and reliability of the analysis by describing how the data are collected and interpreted. Methodologically, it is based on qualitative method. A qualitative phenomenon, phenomena related to or involving quality or kind is described qualitatively. It relied on both primary and secondary sources.

Data sources

This research employed literature and document analysis as one data collection procedure. Therefore, books, journals, constitution of Ethiopia and other federations as well as Ethiopian states, reports and article are consulted. Proclamations, programmes and official documents with relevant ideas were also parts of secondary data for this study. Back up by secondary sources mentioned, this study also depended on data gathered from primary source. The primary source of data is obtained through the use of interview with government officials and experts at federal and state orders of government, academicians and political parties. It strategically and structurally conducted interview so that outputs depended up on the ability of interviewer to avoid bias from every sides.

Sample size and technique method

This study is drawn by purposeful (non-probability) sampling technique. Key respondents are selected based on purposeful sampling method. This technique is used to get authorities, knowledgeable persons and experts in the desired information. As discussed under sample size following this sub-section, before starting the actual data collection, the study had purposefully selected respondent from decided group lists. The interviewees were selected to ensure variety of opinion, but not statistical representation, as the study aim is to understand and not to measure opinions on the issue under discussion. As the list of informants shows, the study has deliberately chosen respondents from the concerned government officials, academicians and political party, both ruling and opposition. Before, the study started the actual data collection; it has already defined which groups and peoples that wanted to obtain information from for a couple of reasons. These are; the primary source of this study is limited to only interview and it is decided to ensure its adequacy using different groups while the other is for triangulation purpose.

Thus, the interviewees can be categorized in to four predetermined groups. Firstly, Government officials found at the state (Oromia National Regional State), including regional state council (*Caffee*). Secondly, Ethiopian Academic group who are familiar to the issues by taking careful procedure and telling them they are purposefully selected representing academicians and the required response has to be from academic view only. Thirdly, government officials at federal level and ministry of federal affairs Intergovernmental Relations strengthening Directorate and Finally political party group which include ruling political party and opposition political party. In doing so, the interviews include discussions with 12 peoples, each lasting a minimum of 15 and a

maximum of 40 minutes. The study used hand written notes through face to face communication, despite the fact that the use of tape recorder would give more accurate information, some informants refused to use tape recorder at the beginning day of interview collection. It is clear that most important of all, to make notes does not make the informant as suspicious and uncomfortable as the use of a tape recorder might do. Some names are kept confidential due to the sensitivity of the matters discussed and not willingness of respondent except those of people who have expressed their name to use visibly.

Data analysis method

The information value of each discussion varies but close to each other to some extent. Some of the interviewees provided substantial and essential information, while others were unwilling to give their information. Some informants manipulate the reality and present it as it best serves their interests while some give information for the question which they are not asked that repeatedly faced me especially, some of government officials found at centre and regional state. When different informants give contradictory versions of information or processes, the study was forced to interpret what is the most likely to have happened depending on the conceptual facts. In such situations, it is particularly important to be aware of its own impact on the interpretation although the study tried to make all sides heard. Finally, similar values and opinions are systematically grouped under one category for better understandings and analysis.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This study was conducted at Oromia national regional state, Ethiopia. This state requires relations with the federal government like the other states. Its proximity to federal government is the unique feature that require cooperation and coordination in their day to day activities and because the capital city Finfine (oromo name) or Addis Ababa is found in this state, which the constitution gives the right of special interest protection.⁴ For instance, as it will elaborated later, one respondent stated, the proposed and on-going plan of connecting Addis Ababa city with Oromia special zone surrounding Finfine through master plan for development and mutual benefit takes not only horizontal relations with Addis Ababa city administration but also required the federal government and concerned executive institution.

Generally, since federal system established after long lived unitary system, there are extensive intergovernmental relations cooperation and coordination between federal and states in general and federal and Oromia regional state in particular, both formally and informally. Even if there is no basic formal guideline for federal-states Intergovernmental relations, every branch

⁴ See Solomon Negussie 'Intergovernmental Relations and Fiscal Issues in Federations: The Situation in Ethiopia and its implications to the Horn, Conference on Constitutionalism & Human Security in the Horn of Africa', August 2008, Addis Ababa. He enunciates the need for cooperation between the federal government and Oromia regional state as regards the administration of Addis Ababa is concerned (*supra note 132*). See also Article 49(5) of the constitution.

of the government, both in the state and the federal is doing it. The various federal executive institutions such as the ministries and agencies engage themselves in a cooperative discussions and meetings with their state counterparts such as bureaus and offices or agencies. To see the impact of these relations on state autonomy, this article starts from theory to practice discussion in Ethiopian context.

Institutions of Federal-State relations: Appraisal of its practice⁵

Almost with no exception, all federation either directly through their constitution or indirectly through legislation establishes the institution that manages and coordinates intergovernmental relations between different spheres. The general principles and common understandings is that institutions of Intergovernmental relations are basically formed to achieve the purpose of the relations between the centre and constituent units and to carry out common or shared programs. The intergovernmental institutions will need to be genuinely collaborative in character, rather than instruments for intergovernmental imposition. At the same time, in establishing formal institutions to improve intergovernmental collaboration, it will be essential to ensure that it is open, transparent, accessible and responsive in order to avoid any public sense that will contribute to a democratic deficit. This would involve establishing an institution made up of individuals with policy expertise that are not influenced by political views and other factors. This section is going to assess the practices of current institution of federal-states relations, about Ministry of Federal Affairs towards the above generally accepted principles.

This study argues that apart from the earlier stated principle on necessity of institution, due to different reasons such as absence of adequate provision of federal-states relations, formal distribution of powers that follows the dual arrangement and not empower the states to implement federally deliberated policies and others, the institution of relations between the states and the federal is more than ever significant in Ethiopia. After federal system launched in 1995, Organization for Regional Affairs is established in Prime Minister Office and due to critics,⁶ this institution was dissolved in 2001 and its task is taken over by Ministry of Federal Affairs which is established as a branch of federal executive institution through federal proclamation. In the proliferation of proclamations No.417/2005 and

691/2010, the power and functions of this executive institution; at the same time federal-states relation institution have been amended. Theoretically speaking, MOFA became more formal and legalized institution organized to serve as focal point in creating good federal-states relationship and cooperation based on mutual understanding and partnership.⁷ Now, the subsequent paragraphs analyze its practical effectiveness towards this mandate as institution of federal-states intergovernmental relations in Ethiopia.

The Ministry of Federal Affairs (MOFA) has been formally established to facilitate the relations between levels of governments. However, it showed little change from the Organization for Regional Affairs. There are critics even from its nature. As stated under the general principle, the institution of intergovernmental relation is expected more or less to be neutral, meaning that not to be influenced by any side and not to be a branch of any spheres body. However, here in Ethiopia formal institution is established as one branch of federal executive and it is not separate institution that from its nature it lacks neutrality and this nullify the principle. For instance, as Assefa noticed, the activity of the Ministry of Federal Affairs in the states is one of the semi-formalized practices that have an impact on the overall federal-state relations that it is an executive institution of the federal government by which the Prime minister exercises a leading role (Assefa, 2007). The attachment of the constituent units in this organ is highly unlikely and also unfeasible if we argue from the general principle point of view. Therefore, from the concept of Intergovernmental Relations institution principle itself, MoFA should not be the appropriate institution. The current design through MoFA provided the federal government a dominant role in determining how the relations aspect should look like. From the very foundation, it seems as a mechanism of controlling the states by the federal government through this institution.

Coming to the experience of some federations, it reveals that the federal and constituent units are represented in intergovernmental relations institutions so that decisions passed takes in to account the interest of both orders of government, states and federal (Ronald, 2005). In Ethiopia, there is no way in which states can be represented in ministry of federal affairs institution because it has been originally established as a federal executive. Thus, the issue is that to what extent the interest of states can be protected in this institution, being a federal executive. Additionally, unlike some other federations, the task of practicing nationwide intergovernmental relations is assigned to a department

⁵ Under this section, my discussion covers the assessment of MoFA through criteria of general principles of institution(s) discussed elsewhere including its practice. In doing so, it identifies its weakness, achievements and problems.

⁶ ORA had no clearly outlined mandates. The federal government used direct control over the states through the advisors of this institution. The members of this institution were cadres of the ruling party and they participated in advising officials and presidents of the states. See Aalen 2002: 91; Merera supra note 124 at 256; Assefa supra note 15 at 378; Asnake supra note 17 at 237

⁷ It is established through 'Reorganization of the Executive Organs of Federal Democratic of Ethiopia Proclamation' Proclamation No.256/2001, Federal Negarit Gazeta 8thYear No.2 Addis Ababa 12th October 2001. According to Art, 21 of Proclamation 417/2005 'Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 12th year No.1, Addis Ababa, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 17th November 2005; it is a formal institution of IGR.

(directorate) within the Ministry which vividly shows lack of political commitment to have a significant process of intergovernmental coordination and collaboration from the side of the government.

In 2003, the federal government passed a new law that provided a system for federal intervention in the states and the task of facilitating this intervention⁸ is given to this ministry. Critics argue that the proclamation endangers the notion of federalism by providing loophole for the federal executive to intervene in the regions on one hand and giving this mandate to this institution on the other hand (Asnake, 2009). Assefa Fishea, for instance, notes the proclamation gives a wide legal framework for federal action that seems to go against the tone of the federal system itself (Assefa, 2007). In addition to the function of coordinating the implementation of decisions, authorizing the intervention of the federal government in the affairs of regional states was given to ministry of federal affairs.⁹ This leads to the critics in the role of this ministry to enhance democratic intergovernmental relations in Ethiopia. In previous discussion it is explained that the institution that manage intergovernmental relation is expected to be strong and neutral from any, including its official. Here in Ethiopia however, the proclamation even gives the power of authorizing federal intervention in states affairs to this institution which is other track.

For some writer, there is a wide variation in applying its mandate towards all states found in Ethiopia. For instance, one writer noted that the general mandate of the Ministry of federal affairs applicable to all the regions appears to be primarily one of coordination. However, its task towards the four peripheral regions (that is, Gambella, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz and Somali) is supervisory and it appears an intrusive ministry of central with wide powers of intervention in local and regional councils than a ministry in charge of ordinary coordination (Asnake, 2009). This clearly affirms that there is disparity in its mandate function. During my personal observation of organizational structure of this institution, the study was able to see that State Minister has four coordination departments established to deal with Afar, Somali, Benishangul Gumuz, and Gambella regions. The four periphery states are established to the aim of article 89 of the constitution that give the central government responsibility of help for least disadvantaged state and proclamations that give this institution responsibility to provide assistance to states particularly to those deserving special support listed above. The point here is that the special support stated does not mean intervention and supervision of this institution in the affairs of those states as the above author also criticize.

On the other hand some authors state that the capacity of this periphery states are too weak and it requires this ministry to intervene. For instance, Young (Young, 1999) argues that the involvement of this institution in periphery states affairs through different mechanism is highly necessary because these states need the assistance of the central government to fill the gap for expertise and human resources that is promised by the constitution.

One respondent from this ministry was asked to give a view on the effectiveness of this institution towards its mandate of creating effective and partnerships relations between federal and states. The respondent stated that MOFA has a mandate to facilitate relations between federal and states levels of governments, but it is obvious that due to problems, this institution's function is limited to enhancing the capacity of less developed states and it has not effectively discharged its tasks as it is given in the proclamation. The respondent added that, like other federal and regional institutions, MOFA is recently engaged in assessing its mandate and achievements. In its findings, promoting IGR is a less emphasized in relation to support for less developed regions.¹⁰ From this informant view, it is clear that for the past many years this institution is not effective in its mandate of facilitating federal-state relations. Currently, however there is a situation of engaging itself in this task. Additionally, practically as MoFA is not involved in the federal and states relations is underlined by one state bureau official. The respondent assert as 'until now, in our relationship with the federal Ministry, there is no role of Ministry of Federal Affairs'¹¹

In Ethiopia, there is a cooperation and coordination between the institution of states or bureaus and federal government through their respective offices. The above informant view also support this idea that in the absence of practical institution that coordinate the relations between the two, central ministries often hold consultations and meetings with their respective bureaus with a view to execute their respective roles. Theoretically, similar regular relations between the central parliament and states councils are expected. The coordination of such relations is the main responsibilities of Ministry of federal affairs as of that proclamation and principle; however existing practices demonstrate that these relations are not facilitated and coordinated by this institution.

Coming to the achievement of Ministry of Federal Affairs, there are issues in relation to the overall mandate as given through proclamation 471/2005. For instance, the followings can be raised but it may not be limited to these only. Firstly, in the task of conflict managing and

⁸ The System for the *Intervention* of the Federal Government in the Regions, Proclamation No. 359/2003, *Federal Negarit Gazeta* 9th Year No. 80 Addis Ababa, 10 July, 2003.

⁹ Article 21 of proclamation No 471/2005; 'A Proclamation to Provide for the Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the FDRE, 12th year No.1, Addis Ababa, federal Negarit Gazeta, 17th November 2005

¹⁰ Personal interview with Tsegabrhan Tadesse: MoFA, IGR General Director; March, 2013; Addis Ababa

¹¹ Interview; Letibelu Motuma, Oromia Regional State Education Bureau; March, 2014, Addis Ababa. Additionally, Interview with Official of Oromia Regional Health Bureau, March, 2014, Addis Ababa

resolution,¹² this institution is doing its level better in facilitating favorable climate of relations and meetings so as to solve misunderstandings and conflicts that arise between states. If it is beyond the political and administrative capacity of this institution, it will solve in collaboration with the House of federation.¹³

The informant repeatedly elaborated that if conflict occurs between states, wide-ranging dialogue between two parties is held by this institution after the federal police force takes place between these states. It is clear that this institution also has a mandate in federal police because it ensures the proper carrying out of it according to proclamation 471/2005(h). It was stated in chapter two that federations employ different mechanisms, both formal and informal to resolve disputes between states and for instance, Canada held regular inter-provincial conferences and India interstate council. However, here in Ethiopia, as stated by the above informant, it is one room that Ministry of Federal Affairs is engaged in.

During personal observation of this institutional structure made, there is department of conflict prevention and security affairs coordination established towards this issue. Secondly, the special support process of carrying out capacity building for less developed states and areas is the other good achievement of this institution according to some informant. One instance is that it played vital role in facilitating special support for the pastoralist areas of the country, implementing federally funded conditional grants to help the marginalized areas and bring proportional development through being with federal board consist of other ministries like ministry of agriculture, ministry of health, ministry of education and others, for the past many years. Thus, the response from this institutions side is that MoFA is active as far as creating partnership intergovernmental relations between federal and states of least developed states such as Afar, Somali, Gambella and Benishangul Gumuz and pastoralist areas of the country is concerned but for other states there is little progress.¹⁴

One has to bear in mind that these achievements part is supposed by this institution respondent and it is one group based result that there may be opposite view from other side. For instance, as stated at the beginning of this section, there are groups, who argue that Ministry of federal affairs' activity towards periphery states is supervising, while this institution responds as it is the area where it achieved success in creating partnership federal-states intergovernmental relationship and claiming better achievements in assisting the less developed states.

In any case, the dilemma still need to be clear is that

¹² Personal Interview with Head of MoFA, IGR Strengthening Directorate General, 14 March 2014, Addis Ababa

¹³ Under chapter two it was stated that according to Art. 48 and 62(6), HoF has a mandate to find solutions to disputes or misunderstandings that arise between states and similarly, proclamation 471/2005, give the same task to MoFA.

¹⁴ Interview, Tsegaberhan Tadesse; Ministry of Federal Affairs, IGR Strengthening Directorate General; March, 2014, Addis Ababa

has MoFA been engaged in administration of federal laws and policies in less developed states and pastoral areas or does it engaged to implement special support or coordinating common agendas and intergovernmental relations of both federal and least developed states. Even, its mandate is limited to capacity building and giving support by being centre without having its offices in these states. Here, its mandate has not to be limited only to least developed states and pastoral areas on one hand and giving special support stated by constitution and proclamations, on the other. Yet, there is little progress in the other states relations with the federal government through this institution which is also affirmed by this institution respondent repeatedly.

The proclamation itself puts the power of federal-states intergovernmental relations to this institution in broad terms. Its role to manage the implementation of federal laws and policies is limited to federal police, prison administration and mine action activities. As stated in chapter two implementation and execution of federal policies in to states are one aspect of federal-states intergovernmental relations and it can be through either giving this mandate to states or establishing federal institution in states that holds this mandate. The Ethiopian reality is neither the former nor the latter. Except what is listed above, in both proclamations of 256/2001 of its establishment and 471/2005, no clear mandate of Ministry of federal affairs is stated in implementation of laws and policies which is one aspect of federal-states intergovernmental relations. Even, the three listed mandate; federal police, prison administration and mine action activities implementation in states have no designed mechanism but through meetings and report communication.¹⁵

Intergovernmental relations and its institution requires to be based on transparent and clarity as one guiding principles. Institutional clarity does not only include activates but also enough capacity to run the mandate in democratic manner. This is because of it demands the institution of intergovernmental relations established formally to create channels of communication and effective dialogue between both institutions of the federal and states. In ministry of federal affairs all these are not developed.¹⁶ Even, its mandate is not adequately known by others and there is some perceive concerning this institution in which some still consider it as previously dissolved institution, ORA. The respondent had clarified that this institution role and mandate is not well known by some public officials of periphery states and there are officials who does not have a good attitude towards it.¹⁷ There are also some writers who validate this respondent

¹⁵ Interview: Confidential Respondent, Ministry of federal Affairs, March/2014, Addis Ababa

¹⁶ Interview: Tsegaberhan Tadesse; MoFA, IGR General Director; March, 2013: Addis Ababa

¹⁷ Ibid; My respondent mentioned this as one obstacle of this institution towards what it is mandated

argument by stating that some perceive this institution through which federal government sends officials to control their activities and that seems to legitimize the greater intervention of federal government in the less developed states than in the other states (Assefa, 2013).

Additionally, this institution has not as such well-developed relations between other central executive and states executive though due emphasis is given currently as stated by Intergovernmental Relations Strengthening General Director Head. During the past years, there were problems of identifying activities that should be accomplished in collaboration with states. The respondent has also stated that currently, more than any time, this institution gives its emphasis on enhancing these tasks. More recently, there is a committee established in collaboration with House of federations in December, 2013 that contain presidents of all regional states.¹⁸ It has technical committees that prepare report on weaknesses, strengths and existing gaps including the study of experiences of other federations.¹⁹ There is a purpose of including enough experts and academicians in this task.

Generally, it is stated that the effectiveness of this institution is at infant stage, if not limited to some extent. There are critics that revolve around this institution from its nature, representation system and overall clarity in its objectives that hinders to enhance effective federal-states intergovernmental relation based on mutual understandings and partnership as stated in the proclamation and there is little progress in the issue of under discussions.

Now, as stated earlier, if the constitution is not adequate concerning both provision and institution(s) of federal-states intergovernmental relations, there is recognition of such failures through different means such as legislation, Agreements, Act and Proclamation. Thus, coming back to the link between institution of intergovernmental relations and state autonomy, as explained and later analyzed in federations experiences, institution(s) established through constitution or legislation to manage and give shape for federal-states intergovernmental relations play vital role in determining the relations, protecting the autonomy of states in the activity of relations between orders of government. This is so because of it is separate institution in which both orders of government are represented and cannot be influenced by either level of government. It also protects the interest of states and federal government. If this is not, federal-states intergovernmental relations will influence autonomy of states in the cover of institution that is established to manage these relations.

In Ethiopia, because of the constitution is not enough and institution of federal-states intergovernmental relations is necessary, Ministry of Federal Affairs is

established. And the assessment of this institutional effectiveness through mentioned principles starting from its nature to practice shows that it is not adequately effective, if not limited to some states as far as its mandate of coordinating and creating partnership intergovernmental relations between federal and states are concerned.

Generally speaking, there is no practical institution of federal-states intergovernmental relations in Ethiopia (Assefa, 2013). As stated elsewhere federal-states intergovernmental relations are inevitable and it is true also in Ethiopia. Now, it is prudent to determine to what extent the constitutionally given autonomy of states can be protected in the absence of effective institution that shape and manage these relations. To put in simple words, the absence of effective institution of federal-states intergovernmental relations leads the inherent federal-states intergovernmental relations to be informal than formal, party channel than institutional. And if all these are so, in the existence of federal-states intergovernmental relations which takes place in vacuum, meaning that in the absence of practical institution, the constitutionally given autonomy of states is influenced in the cover of both orders relations. There are federal executive institutions dominations over state bureaus which can be validated through the practice in which federal ministry plan and organize meetings as well as conferences by their own and latter let states to participate on it for its implementation.²⁰ Thus, reader has to know that the existence of institutional gap in federal-states relations that has its own contribution in weakening autonomy of states. This is so, because, it is due to lack of institution that states could not able to establish forums for negotiation as well as bargaining with the federal government (Assefa, 2013).

Federal-state relations under dominant party system

Political party is one determinant factor of federal-states intergovernmental relations nature, and discussion of political parties exert significant influence on the ability of state governments in federal systems to shape their own destinies in the process of their relations with federal government is clearly made. Whether the party organization is centralized or decentralized it has crucial effects on the relationship between federal and state orders of government. There are writers (William, 1964) who argue that the federal relationship is centralized according to the degree to which the parties organized to operate the federal government control the parties organized to operate the constituent governments and this amounts to the assertion that the proximate cause of variations in the degree of centralization in the

¹⁸ Personal interview with Tsegabrhan Tadesse: MoFA, IGR General Director; March, 2013; Addis Ababa

¹⁹ Ibid

²⁰ Interview: Heads and vice Head of Oromia Regional State Education and Health Bureau, respectively; March, 2014, Addis Ababa. See section 3.5 of this chapter and chapter two of this thesis for its influence on state autonomy

constitutional structure of federalism is the variation in degree of party centralization.

In Ethiopia, except the party channel, there are hardly any institutionalized federal-states intergovernmental relations mechanisms comparing to other federations (Assefa, 2007). And centralized party rule and genuine federalism are incompatible because the presence of an all-powerful party inevitably centralizes power and undermines states autonomy on the other.²¹ As stated in previous chapter Ethiopia's federal arrangement is one dominant ruling party in which ethnic organizations are satellites of one front line political party; Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a multi-ethnic ruling coalition not a monolithic party.²² From most of contemporary conflicts that challenge the federal system, the intergovernmental conflicts are rare, if not absent, due to the fact that federal-states intergovernmental relations is through party channel. However, in the same party organization that controls both federal and state orders of governments and has a centralized structure, it weakens the power of the state governments in a way that undermine states autonomy in the goings-on of both orders of intergovernmental relations.

In Ethiopia, the existence of a coalition ruling party dominance in all the states brings less or no, if not invisible states autonomy. Since the EPRDF exercises hegemonic control in all the regional states through its member and affiliated parties, absorption of power in the hands of the federal is evident. Some writers affirm that party structure in Ethiopia undermines the federal division of power and subordinates states governments to the federal government. Aalen, for instance expressed that practically, the EPRDF is controlling all the regional state governments in the Ethiopian federation, either directly through the member parties or indirectly through affiliate parties, in which the largely centralized party structures appear to contradict with the devolved power structures of a federal system.²³

In the absence of well-organized institutions to facilitate federal-states relations, party line is used as an option to accomplish tasks because the party line is well organized. The prevalent political role of EPRDF at federal level and its partner at states level have created

favorable and supportive political environments for building positive federal-states relations. Members of the ruling party are used as good models to implement new policies and strategies adopted at centre in their state. In an interview with one member of the Oromia regional council, I understand the fact that, everything which is proposed by the centre is endorsed by the respective regional party which shows the commitment of every member to its parent political organization, EPRDF.²⁴ This creates a chance for the centre to enjoy the right to do things in the affairs of states. According to this respondent this is because of things proposed at the federal, whether it is in line with the states priority or not, is respected though there is examining to what extent it matches the interest of state.

It is the party structure; subordination of states to federal government along with its impact on the process of policy making that explains the centralizing trend in the Ethiopian federal system (Assefa, 2007). Thus, as argued above, in federal-state relations one of the reasons that create impact on autonomy of state is the EPRDF conception of satellite parties, which run the regional governments under the supervision of the central committee of the ruling coalition. Through this channel, the federal government enjoys the right to do or undo things in the state.²⁵

The constitutional rights for the states to formulate and implement plans and policies are severely diminished by the fact that state governments, which are under EPRDF's hegemony, follow the federally designed policies and plans. Although the states in Ethiopia are both financially weak, it is first of all the centralized party structures which undermine the state's ability to act independently from the federal. The country's overall policy is designed at the federal by different formats and its direct implementation is through ruling political party. Among others, the five years development plan, Grand Renaissance Dam Project and its process, the Business process reengineering package, Development and Transformation Plan, the Millennium Development Goals, usually comes from the center.

Here, the issue is not why these policies are legislated at the centre because it is due to Art-51 of constitutional power division or others, but the risk is how does the federal government implement or execute and administer these overall strategies and policies with in states and whether states have a role in the design of the policies. The reality is that through active ruling party that opens a loophole for the federal to stretch its hands in the state units of government. There are a number of policy documents prepared at the federal EPRDF level and

²¹ See Fundamental federal theory of Elazar. Elazar Daniel 'Exploring federalism' Tuscaloosa, AL: Alabama University Press; 1987 at 178 and Duchacek, I.D. 'Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics'; Lanham, Md: University Press of America; 1987 at 330 cited in Aalen, 'Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000' Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2002 at 1

²² See Alem Habtu, Multiethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: A study of the Secession Clause in the Constitution, Oxford University Press, Published by Publius/Spring 2005 at 313-335, Kidane Mengisteab, Ethiopia's Ethnic Based Federalism: 10 Years after, African Issues, Vol. 29, No. 1-2, African Studies Association, 2001, at 20-25.

²³ Lovise Aalen 'Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000' Report R 2002: 2 Chr. Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human Rights Chr. Michelsen Institute Bergen, Norway at 81

²⁴ Interview with confident Oromia Regional Council Member, March 2014, Addis Ababa

²⁵ A central committee leads the ruling coalition. The central committee generates specific plans of action which are the basis of EPRDFs' plans that are expected to be implemented nationwide. See Ibid at 387, Aalen, *supra* note 138 at 82.

uniformly applicable down to the states. For instance, one writer noted that the growth and transformation plan (GTP), Ethiopia's five year plan was discussed through party before presented and approved by the federal parliament and state councils (Assefa, 2013). Thus, the apparatus of implementing all plans is the party channel rather than organizing formal negotiation forums.

There are arguments that states ruling party follow the line dictates of the federal ruling party and lacks autonomy of states given constitutionally. For instance, at Oromia regional state, Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization party is dominant ruling party and one member of the EPRDF. Concerning this, there are two arguments. First argument is that opposition parties criticize this party that it influences the constitutionally given autonomy and subordinate Oromia regional state to federal government because it is not independent, has no own plans but implements the EPRDF.²⁶ In addition to opposition parties, there are some writers who note that OPDO is less influential and autonomous which has internal problems.²⁷ The second argument is that from the ruling party of this regional state, OPDO itself.²⁸ According to this argument, 'starting from its nature, it is a party established for democratic development of the country and within more than 20 years it had improved state autonomy and self-administration by being with other party. However, concerning its autonomy, because the coalition of party established at federal, EPRDF is built on democratic line, it is autonomous to decide its affairs at any time without any influence and the more focused agenda is one and one that is the development of the country'.²⁹ Thus, the respondent stated that it has its own congress to discuss on its issue and to improve cooperation and coordination relations with federal government.

Now, it is clear that federal-state relationship is centralized or decentralized according to the degree to which the parties organized to operate the federal government control the parties organized to operate the constituent governments. This party has members in central committee of EPRDF that brings the rule and regulation of this central party to states. In this centralized structure of EPRDF party, what is proposed at centre goes down to the state ruling party through top-down approach. The federal party as well as this regional party uses different mechanisms to know to what extent the centrally legislated plans are implemented at all levels.

Among these, criticism or *gimgema*³⁰ can be mentioned. One respondent stated that *chephoo* (Oromiffa which mean criticism) and one-five cooperative union has advantages in improving good governance but also affecting employees and officials of this party and bureaus from top to down.³¹ If there is some one that oppose or does not support the plans and activity of EPRDF or fail to achieve his/her own plans as well as bureau, he/she provide reasons for that and will be reduced from his/her position or remove from power. Here, one may argue that it has advantage in one or other, but the point is that using it as a mechanism and preferred instrument to discern state and federal officials who fell out with the EPRDF has its influence on state autonomy.

There are writers who criticize this system as dictating government activities by party (Kjetil and Sarah, 2002). Such mechanism shows to what extent Oromia regional state ruling party is independent and autonomous from the federal ruling party in one hand and gives autonomy to the state it is ruling in the other.³² This is because of the links between the state and its ruling party, in which government business is discussed and decisions are made in party meetings that precede meetings of state bodies. The Oromo elites consider the ruling party of this regional state called Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization (OPDO) as a marionette of the country's ruling party, Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) that it lacks the autonomy for issue of the state it is ruling due to the pressure from federal government, regarding as centralized federalism.³³ For these elites, the informal relation with the centre through party channel brings lack of autonomy because the ruling party of this state follows the dictates of the federal party which is EPRDF.

On the other hand, as discussed earlier, OPDO/EPRDF argues with reason that it is autonomous as other member parties to decide its affairs because it has equal number of central and executive committee of 45 and 9 respectively in EPRDF that is equal number with other member parties.³⁴ According to this group respondent,

³⁰ Gimgema was widely used by the TPLF/EPRDF during the armed struggle as a way of critically evaluating the performance of its leadership and the general membership. It is a way of monitoring the activities of regional officials, used to keep officials always on guard by making them to admit mistakes publicly and openly and to weed out officials and ordinary members of party suspected of not following the official line. (Young 1998b: 43-4 cited in Asnake Kefale, 'Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions', (PhD Dissertation, Lidein University, the Netherlands, 2009.) at 251.

³¹ Interview; Confident Official Respondent of Oromia National Regional State; March, 2014; Addis Ababa

³² Ibid at 29 and the paper reads 'OPDO and SEPDF have been widely considered less influential and autonomous; characterizations which continuing purges of members would do little to reverse' at 30.

³³ See Merera Gudina, *The Ethiopian State and the Future of the Oromos: The Struggle for 'Self-Rule and Shared-Rule'*; A paper presented to OSA Annual Conference; July 29 – 30, Minneapolis, USA

³⁴ Interview; Gemechis Guteta; Head of Political and Organizational Affairs at Central Office of OPDO; Mar/2014, Addis Ababa

²⁶ Interview; Gebru Gebremariam, Oromo Democratic Congress (ODC/MEDREC) Gen. Secretariat, March, 2014, Addis Ababa

²⁷ Sarah Vaughan and Kjetil Tronvoll 'Structures and Relations of Power Ethiopia': Country Strategy 2003–2007, Swedish international Development Cooperation Agency; Stockholm Sweden at 29 and 30 as accessed on 02 march 2014 on <http://www.addisvoice.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Structure-of-power.pdf>

²⁸ Interview for OPDO Central Office Organizational and Political Affairs Head; Ato Gemechis Guteta, March/2014, Addis Ababa

²⁹ Ibid

plans and strategies established at EPRDF go downward to OPDO to improve 'development, democracy and enhance peace and stability' of the country and has no influence on their autonomy as well as state that this party is ruling. Aalen on the other hand noted that EPRDF is essentially a centralized party, where party officials at all levels promotes upward accountability to the party organs above rather than downward accountability to the people and borders between the party and the state bureaucracy are blurred, and this enables the party to utilize the state administration for its own purposes.³⁵ In view of the party-state merger, it is understandable that Ethiopia has difficulty in distinguishing between them.

Generally, the party structure based federal-states relations in Ethiopia undermines the federal division of power and subordinates the state governments to the federal government which affects the latter's autonomy. This is so, because the party structures are centralized, and when the same party at federal and state have strong links, the federal-state relations leads inevitably to a centralized division of power which affects the constitutionally given autonomy of states.

Informal federal-states relations³⁶ and states autonomy

In Ethiopia, the formal federal-state intergovernmental relation through institution and regular basis is at its inception stage and characterized by the informal channels. Critics indicate that, many of the intergovernmental issues are virtually dictated by the federal government and through the informal technique of ruling party. The focal point remains to be the non-formal means which perhaps open the door for the federal government and its institution to take all the initiatives and in that way establish centrally adopted agendas.

In Ethiopia, due to existence of constitutional and institutional gaps and other reasons discussed earlier, the federal executive and the EPRDF party dominates relationships between the federal and states orders of government (Asnake, 2009). As discussed earlier, the relationships between federal and states are more through party channel (Aalen, 2002; Assefa, 2007) without constitutional, institutional or legal framework and due to this the federal executive and party channel dominates the federal-states intergovernmental relations.

³⁵ Aalen, 'Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience' 1991-2000, Bergen: Chr. Michelse, Institut Development Studies and Human Rights, 2002 at 99 see also Kassahun, Alemo 'The Ethiopian Transition in Regional Perspective Election processes, Liberation movements and Democratic change in Africa': Conference Maputo 8-11 April 2010 at 10.

³⁶ As pointed out, informal intergovernmental relations, for the purpose of this study includes the meetings, discussions, workshops and other dialogues between the federal governments and their specific departments without prearranged institutionally, regular and legal frameworks including in fact the party channels. It include letter, e-mail, personal communication, through different means, that states alone or jointly can't express their autonomy b/c it is already one side, top-down approach.

Concerning this, Ethiopian late PM noted as follows:

The collaboration between the regional governments and the federal government was happening because of their [state] willingness to cooperate. The cooperation was not happening through federal system principles, which sanctions their relationship. Even if the cooperation between the regions and the federal government should continue in the future, it is anticipated that the lack of a legal framework, which sanctions/regulates their relationship, might engender problems.³⁷

From this statement it can be argued that the federal-states intergovernmental relations in Ethiopia have impact on the latter's autonomy in the absence of legal framework and basic guidelines though it is based on their consent which can emerge from different factors. From my point of view, Ethiopian federalism is relatively infant, comparing with these account more than century in one hand, and the variety in states capacity and resource will require states to show their willingness for cooperation that gives opportunity for the federal government and its institution to dominate intergovernmental relations.

Intergovernmental relations dimension can be formal or informal and the latter is developed through post-constitution. Informal intergovernmental relations assume less organized and less regulated to shape, conducted via telephones, e-mails, letters and communication, and it is susceptible to connivance (Meekison, 2002). The informal relations within the federal framework can also take the form of conferences held to discuss common problems, states and federal officials meetings, workshops, ministerial meetings with state sectors to share information, or the initiation of policy at one level of government which encourages or promotes similar policies to be adopted at other levels of government (Meekison, 2002). As it is carried out mostly between executives and behind closed doors, the legislature and the people are alienated from the process. It is stated that in such situation the extent in which autonomy of state affected is high because of absence of formal mechanisms that guide it.³⁸

Here, the focus is the relationships that exist between institution of federal ministry and respective state bureau in the absence of institution that manage these relations and which are not based on regular basis. As pointed out in comparative overview chapter, the practices of South Africa and Germany have showed that national ministries conduct several meetings and discussions with respective Provincial/Lander ministries. In Ethiopia it is

³⁷ Meles 2003:7 cited in Asnake Kefale; 'Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Regional Study: Netherlands, Leiden university, at 239 as accessed on 12/February/2014, visited at <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/13839/chapter%20ten.pdf?sequence=5>

³⁸ See conceptual frameworks, chapter two of this thesis

similar trends that various ministries of the federal have direct and close contacts with their corresponding bureaus in state governments. In addition to this, in south Africa, using the Presidents Coordinating Council(PCC), forums are conducted twice a year between the president and the premiers of the provincial governments in a view to discuss on the implementation of national policies, dispute resolutions and other related issues. Similarly in Germany, regular conferences are held between the federal chancellor and the minister presidents of the Lander in every four months. These conferences are used to evaluate whether the national laws and policies are executed in the Lander governments.³⁹

In Ethiopia, similar forums have not yet been started. There are no institutionalized meetings (Assefa, 2007) between respective heads of health, education and agriculture, of the federal government and the states. The prime minster does not usually conduct regular meetings and conferences with the presidents of states governments except in party meetings and conferences where the prime minster and most presidents of the states government meet.

There are no formal meetings at governmental level between federal ministers and state governments. Nor are there any such meetings among representatives of legislative bodies of the federal and state governments. In such kind of intergovernmental relations, federal-state relation takes one side direction which is often a top down approach and brings the states to serve as an administrative agent of the federal rather than being independent entities created by the constitution. What is collected from data also supports this statement. For instance there was informant stated that there is communication with federal through meetings, conferences, workshops and sending letter to each other. But this is not on regular basis; communication occurs with respective federal sectors if the need arises and the federal sectors directly contact respective bureaus of states.⁴⁰ Now, the issue is that to what extent the informal form of relations between the federal and states takes in to account the autonomy of the latter.

Ultimately, the federal government becomes the major player of the political scene by letting the states to be mere implementers of the federally deliberated ideas, policies and strategies. For instance, the execution of exclusive federal policy and laws in states in which many of the federal Ministries do not have branch offices outside Addis Ababa nor there is any express delegation of power to the state executive to enforce exclusive federal powers (Assefa, 2007). As it will be elaborated more in its own section, the duality implied under Article 50(2) implies existence of institutions to cover the whole field of federal powers enumerated in the federal constitution but in many fields, the federal government

has not yet organized institutions to enforce its laws. In practice however, states executive organs implement as well as administer exclusive federal powers without expressed delegation and authorization due to informal as well as infant stage federal-state intergovernmental relations. Thus, it shall take into account long term historical or political evolutions and perceptions, which are essential dimensions.

De facto nature and political culture of Federal-States relations⁴¹

In Ethiopia, the constitution is clear that it establishes dual and as far as dual is taken place one can determine competitive federal-states intergovernmental relations. Practically, however, there is a wide ranging intergovernmental cooperation by which the federal government and its executive institution proposes some projects and plans and the states retains the authority to implement or to follow up the implementation of these projects in their own jurisdiction.⁴² Incidentally, the cooperation between both orders of government is usually dominated by the federal and its institution owing to several factors which results the concentration of powers in the hands of the federal government and its executive institutions. The study discussion here is that the cooperation at the cost of autonomy that states shows to the federal government because of different reasons such as the same ruling political party at federal and states orders of government, political legitimacy of the power holders, capacity gap of states and others.

On the other hand, the states should have the political culture of challenging the federal government for their constitutionally given power in their relations with federal government. However, the state officials in Ethiopia exercise less authority against the federal government compared to other countries (Mehari, 2008). Even though, it emerges from different reasons, it is clear that it influences the autonomy of state governments. Federal-state excessive cooperative relations and political culture weakens states to defend their autonomy. It is clear that extensive strict hierarchical cooperation contributes to the reduction of conflict, but it also reduces the autonomy and freedom of action of states because it can be taken as an instrument by which the federal will take the front hands in designing policies and initiatives and the states follow the federal guidelines (Ronald, 2008).

In the constitution, generally speaking to say explicitly about federal-state intergovernmental cooperation or

³⁹ See Chapter two of this thesis for both south Africa and Germany

⁴⁰ Interview; Confident Bureau Official of Oromia Regional State; March 2013: Addis Ababa

⁴¹ Political culture emphasizes a strict hierarchical understanding of federal-states orders of government. The situation when and where states fail both intentionally and unintentionally to say no for the activity that affects their autonomy. See Mehari Taddele, 'Devolution of Power in Ethiopia: Legal and Political Aspects': An Abridgment of papers Submitted to the University of Oxford and Harvard: UN Conference Center, Addis Ababa; 2008 at ().

⁴² Personal Interview with Dr. Hashim Tewfik; Requested to present his view from Academic point on 03/April/2014, Addis Ababa university

competition seems difficult. However, from the reading of the four corners of the constitution, as dual federalism is put in place, one can conclude that, competition has been taken as a norm. Keeping this line of argument, there is a provision that affirm about the respective duty of both federal and states towards respecting the areal jurisdictions of each other, what federal writers labeled as the rule of federal comity and the preamble on the other affirm the creation of one political and economic state.⁴³

From this provision one may argue that, the autonomous existence of the two levels is by itself an analytic of their mutuality and undeniably results in cooperative arrangements. Now, under chapter two and beginning of this section, it was stated that in extreme cooperative government the autonomy became a matter than competitive as its name also indicates, states act in case of competitive through retaining their autonomy while in cooperative states lose their autonomy.

In Ethiopia, though, the clear constitutional recognition of cooperative federal system is not adequate, the practice however is obvious; everything is going on through the cooperative forms either arranged in consultation with the respective states or by the exclusive initiatives of the federal government institutions.⁴⁴ Incidentally however, such cooperation is dominated by the center owing to several factors and results the concentration of powers in the hands of the federal government. In this wide ranging intergovernmental cooperation forum, as stated earlier, the federal government proposes some projects and the states retain the authority to implement or to follow up the implementation of these projects. The vast areas of socio-economic policies such as education, health, trade and investment are issues arrangement with the cooperation activities in Ethiopia. However, it is a top-down approach in which the state is not initiating to establish forums for expression of their common agenda in their relations with the federal government that ultimately creates favorable climate for the federal government in the enjoyment of political powers. Here, the extreme cooperation that states shows towards federal government can be validated through implementation of federal policies and laws by states institution without authorization of constitution.

Additionally, as it will be elaborated following the next section, differences from the federal laws and policies are not visible except change of language. For instance, state directly use motto made at federal through translating language only. Some officials whom I interviewed for these issues limit autonomy of state to use of language, culture and religion only. For one respondent whom I would not like to proceed before presenting his/her view is presented as it is as follows:

“The right to use and develop language, religion, and culture is completely protected within the past two decades. EPRDF as ruling party of Ethiopia and OPDO as ruling party of this state is still working further and [...], I think things discussed at federal is enough as far as we are not different from other states found in Ethiopia.”⁴⁵

From the study point of view, this issue is due to political culture of couple interrelated reasons. First, the situation of Ethiopia before birth of federal system was extreme unitary of ‘one nation, one language and one religion’. Once, these diversities are recognized at infant stage federal system as well as federal-state intergovernmental relations it leads to evaluate today through yesterday rather than through constitutional principles. The second reason is that political culture that emphasizes a strict hierarchical understanding of orders of government and excessive faithfulness of state officials towards federal government. In any cases, Ethiopian federal system as well as federal-states intergovernmental relations is at newborn age comparing to these federation that count up almost more than a century. For this reason, Ethiopian federal-state relations should be seen as a continuous and dynamic process rather than a constant and fixed system.

Before closing this section, it is possible to show important instance in which states fail to retain their constitutional right because of *de jure* cooperation they show towards federal government. Under previous section delegation is stated as a one basis of federal-states intergovernmental relations. In Ethiopian constitution, there is only downward delegation which the federal government, when necessary, delegate to the states powers and functions granted to it by Article 51 of the constitution. However, there is a practice of upward delegation in which states give some of their constitutional rights to federal government. For instance, Assefa noted the case of land administration in which the federal government encourages states to delegate the power to administer land in states respective territories to the federal government in 2010/2011.⁴⁶ Thus, such unconstitutional practices influence constitutional division of power as well as constitutionally given autonomy of states.

Federal-states IGR hinder state autonomy in Ethiopian federal system: Is the argument convincing?

In Ethiopia, the federal-state intergovernmental relations

⁴³ See FDRE Constitution preamble and Article 59, respectively

⁴⁴ Personal interview made with academician group, March/2014, Addis Ababa University: Addis Ababa

⁴⁵ Interview with Confident Official of Oromia National Regional State; March,2014, Addis Ababa

⁴⁶ Constitutionally speaking, According to Art, 52(2(d)) states have the right to administer land and natural resources in accordance with the federal laws. See Assefa Fiseha ‘Ethiopia’s Experiment in Accommodating Diversity’; A Twenty Years Balance Sheet; *Ethiopian Journal of Federal Studies*; Centre for Federal Studies; The Addis Ababa University Press, vol.1, No.1, 2013 at 121

has influence as stated earlier on the autonomy of states because of its party structure based relations, informal relations, and political culture of extreme cooperation and absence of practical institution that manages intergovernmental relations between the two spheres. Thus, due to the dominant position of the federal government and its institutions by different methods, the states autonomy is undermined and seems to be checked by a centralized party structure, centralized policy making and implementation and administration of federal laws and policies by states. We have seen how Ethiopian federal-states IGR influences autonomy of state in preceding sections, this section tries to briefly develop this argument through showing some autonomy of states affected because of federal-states relations. In doing so, it is limited to legislative and executive autonomy of states since my objective is not assessment of states autonomy which is further than these two dimensions. In addition to this, with notification the first sub-section provides an assessment of the ongoing proposed integrated master plan of Addis Ababa with Oromia special zone surrounding Finfine constitutionality from federalism principles as this study is a case based with particular references to ONRS.

Addis Ababa integrated master plan: Argument from federalism principle

The Master Plan undermines Oromo language and erases Oromo Culture and Identity. The Ethiopian state has been engaging in erasing and undermining Oromo identity and culture since its inception. This did not happen through “natural process” of wilful acceptance of people as some try to convince, but through forceful assimilation policy that explicitly intended to undermine and erase Oromo culture and identity. Even though there is ample evidence to attest to this evil policy, Tedla Haile’s (Ethiopian Minister of Education and Art in the 1920s) MA thesis and his successor Sahle Tsedalu’s policy memo epitomizes the case in point. While Sahle Tsedalu vowed to root out all non-Amharic-Ge’ez language, “Pagan language” according to him, his predecessor Tedla Haile outlined policy guidelines by which the process of erasing Oromo culture could be implemented. Bahru Zewidie wrote: “Tedla goes back to Classical Rome to demonstrate how the army has always been a factor for assimilation, be it through the intermarriage of garrison troops with local women or the recruitment of subjects’ people into the imperial arm.

Likewise, all other facts of government policy-administration, justice, economic organization- should be regulated by the policy of assimilation. Provincial boundaries need to be redrawn to facilitate the policy. Oromo numerical predominance in the southern provinces should be tempered by a policy of Amhara settlement. Tigreans too should be encouraged to settle in the southern provinces, as they are great assimilator

by virtue of their religious fervor and their inherent weakness in learning non-semitic language.” (Bahiru Zewde, “Pioneers of Change”, 2002). The Master Plan under discussion is a logical continuation of this old policy with exact same end goal.

The Master Plan violates core Human Rights. It deprives millions of people around Finfinnee (Addis Ababa) of their only means of livelihood their land. It threatens their right to live-core human right. The Master Plan extends Historical injustice which has been in place since 1841, that is, from the time of Sahilesilassie’s expedition to current Finfinnee/Addis Ababa. For the last 180 years Oromos at the center of Addis Ababa/Finfinnee have been subjected to inhuman treatment, massacre, forceful eviction, dispossession and perpetual exploitation. It is worth mentioning the eyewitness accounts of William Harris, the then British Diplomat to Shewan court of Sahilessilassie, who accompanied Sahilessilassie in several expeditions to the center of Addis Ababa.

“The luckless inhabitants, taken quite by surprise, had barely time to abandon their property, and fly [flee] for their lives to the fastness of Entotto ... The spear of the warrior searched every bush for the hunted foe. Women and girls were torn from their hiding to be hurried into helpless captivity. Old men and young were indiscriminately slain and mutilated among the fields and groves; flocks and herds were driven off in triumph, and house after house was sacked and consigned to the flames ... Whole groups and families were surrounded and speared within the walled courtyards, which were strewn with the bodies of the slain. [Those] who betook themselves to the open plain were pursued and hunted down like wild beasts; children of three and four years of age, who had been placed in the trees with the hope that they might escape observation, were included in the inexorable massacre, and pitilessly shot among the branches. In the course of two hours the division left the desolated valley laden with spoil, and carrying with them numbers of wailing females and mutilated orphan children, together with the barbarous trophies that had been stripped from the mangled bodies of their murdered victims.”⁴⁷

The same violent incursion continued up until 1886 when Menelik’s total occupation took place. As a result the Oromo population in the area was reduced to 33% in 1900 EC, and further getting down to 18.3% in 1945 EC, according to Prof. Laphiso G. Dellebo. Even though Addis Ababa is surrounded 360 degrees by Oromo, the demographic proportion of Oromo is stuck at around 19% over the last 70 years. This clearly shows the historical injustices perpetrated systematically by the successive regimes. In Addis, Oromos have been deprived to use

⁴⁷ Major William Harris’ book “The Highlands of Aethiopia” Vol. II (p. 185-198)”

their language to access state institutions, to promote their culture in the city and enjoy dignified treatment in their own ancestral land. The current Master Plan is a logical perpetuation of the same historical injustice of eviction, dispossession and ethnic cleansing.

The Master Plan takes away Economic Opportunity from Oromo farmers in the area. Land, Capital and Labour are the major input of production in an economy. The Oromo farmers of the area who are the majority contributors in the production of value should have been the major shareholders in any development and investment on their own land. Land is the most expensive factor of production. Paradoxically, under the current TPLF/EPRDF led land grabbing system, Oromo farmers are outrageously deprived of their fair share in the productive investment going on in their land. This is legally a crime and morally despicable.⁴⁸

The Master Plan undermines the principles of Social Justice. In just and democratic society, the state fairly taxes the haves in order to redistribute income to the have nots so as to create equitable and harmonious society. In the Ethiopian case, the TPLF led regime is transferring immense wealth from the haves to the have nots, thereby creating a dire situation. This is contradictory to the principles of social justice. It results in disharmony and discord in the society. It is an outright act of dispossessing the have nots in order to enrich powerful and wealthy party affiliated thugs. It will create grave social disparity and inequality in the society.

The master plan undermines the principles of Sustainable Development. Development is not enriching the rich and impoverishing the poor. It doesn't mean erecting high rise buildings on farm lands or building mansions and bungalows by evicting farmers whose only means of livelihood is their land. According to Nobel Winner renowned economist Amartya Sen, development should be human centered that expands their scope of freedom. Development should have been providing electricity, telephone lines, roads, schools and health care centers to surrounding Oromo farmers in order to better off their quality of life. Contradictory to these developmental goals, the current Master Plan worsens their living condition and pushes them to the verge of death, evicts them from healthy environment and reduces them from poverty to destitution, replaces productive land with luxury living mansions for the rich and it causes environmental disaster. It is not morally just and economically sustainable.

It undermines Peace and Harmony among communities. The Master Plan evicts millions and reduces them to a life of destitution. It will create serious and legitimate grievance from the side of the victims in particular and among Oromo people in general. It will undermine social harmony and opportunity of

coexistence, leading to perpetual conflict.

Federal-state relations and state legislative autonomy

The constitution is clear that it authorizes the states to formulate and execute social and development policies, strategies and plans of the state within the overall federal framework. As a result, formally speaking the states have wide powers of policy making. In federal-states intergovernmental relations, one mechanism in which the federal government uses to influence states autonomy is through the use of policy making. The states copy the federal policies and harmonization of federal laws and policy by the state is widespread, mainly due to the party congruence and decision making structure and states capacity and expertise to bring their own that is different from the federal. The operation of state legislative autonomy is affected by the fact that laws and policies process has been mainly channelled by the EPRDF as dominant ruling political party, in practice making the political processes much more centralized than its constitutional form (Ronald, 2007).

Political party is one determinant factor of federal-states intergovernmental relations and it is clear that an Ethiopian federal-states relation is through party channel in which its party structure undermined autonomy of states. In Ethiopian federal-states relations, the EPRDF dominance strengthens the dominance of the federal government in law making as well as social, political and economical policies (Andreas, 2013). It is said earlier that different policy and laws are prepared at the central EPRDF level and uniformly applicable down to the states before presented and approved in the federal parliament without taking interest of states.⁴⁹ The members of EPRDF found at states influences for direct use and duplication of policies and laws made at the centre. Thus, in practice policies, plans, laws as well as constitutions of states government shows no (few) signs of divergences from policy and laws of federal government (Andreas, 2013). For instance, the constitution of Oromia regional state itself is just a copy of the federal constitution in different aspects. One instance that this study would like to mention for this argument is that in connection with the right to secession, the Oromia constitution Article 39, like the federal constitution affirms the unconditional right of the Oromo people to self-administration, including the right to secession by stating similar preconditions as it is stated in the federal constitution for realizing the right to secession (The Oromia constitution 2001, Art.39 (5)).⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Interview; Gebru Gebremariam, Oromo Democratic Congress (ODC/MEDREC) Gen. Secretariat, March, 2014, Addis Ababa

⁴⁹ Assefa Fiseha 'Ethiopia's Experiment in Accommodating Diversity; A Twenty Years Balance Sheet; Ethiopian Journal of Federal Studies; Centre for Federal Studies; The Addis Ababa University Press, vol.1, No.1, 2013 at 137

⁵⁰ Additionally, Tsegaye Regassa has noted that state constitutions are similar with federal constitution especially in their Form, legal and political vocabulary, functions as well as content. See Tsegaye Regassa, 'State constitutions in Ethiopia: A Preliminary observation', A summary for the Bellagio Conference, University of Amsterdam, March 22-27, 2004 at 6-8

Legislative autonomy of states at federal level is protected through second chamber. For instance, in South Africa, the National Council of Provinces is the second chamber of South Africa's national parliament and a concrete expression of the principles of cooperative government that are central to their Constitution. The role of this chamber is representing the provincial perspective within the national Parliament and giving the provinces a collective say in national legislation, providing the entree for provinces in to national policy-making as a bridge between the provincial and national governments.

In Ethiopia, states have no (less) control over law legislated by the federal government and this is because Ethiopia has no second chamber law making function in the areas of shared policy making. There is a huge academic and political debate on the lack of real legislative power to the House of the Federation that the system is an exclusion of states interest at the federal level in policy making. It is possible to argue that the arrangement may have unenthusiastic consequence in preserving the interest of the states especially where there is unmitigated party competition in the two orders of government because of absence of institutional forums in which states reflect their interest in national policy making. Evidently the Ethiopian federal set up is among the exceptions with respect to comprising constituent units with no role in the law making process at the central level. It is obvious that the political process provide a better alternative when both the federal and state governments actively involved in the federal legislative process. In the absence of the states say at the central policy making process, undoubtedly, one may imagine the existence of institutional based cooperative forums as the states are not well informed of the laws exclusively made at the federal. However, the reality is as stated above there is lack of institution in which states establish forums for negotiation as well as bargain with the federal government.

There are indicators that states government fails to use their real autonomy of policy making as opposed to the constitutional framework. There is policy power centralization not only in areas exclusively given to the federal but also states which resulted in the moderate autonomy of member states (Aalen, 2002). Here, this argument can be validated by the reality that we found similar policies across state and federal in different aspects. In the area of federal law-making, the federal principle is undermined and autonomy of states seems to be checked by a centralized party structure and centralized policy making (Assefa, 2007).

Coming to state's law and policy making in their jurisdiction, due to close and party channel based, in the absence of well-organized institution, federal-states intergovernmental relations leads states to directly apply federal laws and policies. Concerning this, one state official respondent is invited to share his/her view that the

constitution gives states the right to make their own polices and regulation in their own jurisdiction and how this constitutionally given autonomy is going. Practically, they are not trying to fit in their context as far as formulation and execution of economical, social and developmental policies, strategies and plans of their state (Art, 52(3)) is concerned but implementing similar policies from the federal to down through sector.⁵¹ The respondent also suggest that state council has a power to make rule and regulation with in this state jurisdiction, but in practice it is limited to only assessing what is federally adopted. However, there are no instances that can be mentioned in which regional council has changed what is adopted at federal though it participated in examining its laws and regulations at different time.⁵² Additionally, there are scholars who support this idea and suggest that it is fiscal dependence of states on federal government coupled with constitutional commitment to a single economic community that affects the constitutional autonomy of state's law and policy makings and created uniformity in planning and policy-making (Andreas, 2013).

The pattern, capacity and structure of state governments determine the system and extent of Intergovernmental Relations existing between federal and states. If the state is too weak to run everything, it requires the intervention from federal. In such situation, it is not the intergovernmental relation itself or the federal government that brings the ineffective autonomy of states. From this view, the point that can be raised is that Ethiopian federalism is young compared to other federations that almost account more than century. This leads to say none of all states are self- sufficient and each requires daily assistance from the centre. From this one can draw a conclusion that legally speaking, the legislative autonomy of states are cannot influenced because of the intergovernmental relation exist between two spheres but because of the state's weakness to run activities by their own due to their capacity and policy expertise.

The wonder here is that how much the constitution provides a space for the states to put in to practice these powers,⁵³ and the states are using these powers and reflecting their autonomy through different mechanisms at the federal. For instance, in the exclusive federal powers the federal is entitled with the major policy making roles and in the most substantial affairs of the country. It is practically difficult for the states to make a law in the major areas of socio-economic sphere and due to informal federal-states relations exist between them; they

⁵¹ Personal Interview; Anima Kedir: Oromia National Regional Council (Caffee), March, 2014, Addis Ababa

⁵² Ibid

⁵³ The constitution itself has centralized feature of policy making. See *ibid* at 96 and Aalen, *supra* note 165: 59-61; Andreas Eshete, *supra* note 225: 166-167 captured in Assefa Fiseha; 'Federalism and Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study'; Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2007 at 337

have some administration and implementation powers than policy making. This argument here can be validated through absence of enough federal institutions in states for all bulk of policy areas through which the federal execute its exclusive power of policy making that will be discussed following this section. State and federal government has close relations which is based on mutual understanding and party structure that is well organized and active to harmonize federal policy in the states.

Generally, in practice, the states accept the economic, social and development policy and laws as well as policy issued by the federal government. The five-year plans to be implemented are adopted at federal level and become the basis for state government plans and policies (Aalen, 2007). In theory, they can adapt the policies that can fit their own circumstances but the federal government plays a key role in influencing through both orders intergovernmental relations which is based mainly through party channel and informal in the absence of practical institution that manage these relations and because the states lack the required expertise to bring alternative policies.

Federal-State relations and state executive autonomy

In order to create a smooth implementation of policy frameworks, the institutionalization of federal-states intergovernmental relation forums is appropriate; if not however, it will be odd thought if the federal government requires the states to execute laws exclusively made by the federal government without establishing institution.

In Ethiopia, the conceptual ambiguity is the implementation of federal laws and policies in the constituent states as the one field of federal-states Intergovernmental Relations. As it is pointed out under chapter two, federal systems enforce their laws and policies by setting up dual structures, federal and state institutions for dual federalism, or by assigning the state machinery with the power to enforce both federal and state laws for executive federalism. The Constitution appears to propose dual structure⁵⁴ that it states: 'The federal government and the states shall have legislative, executive and judicial powers.' This shows that there will be parallel federal and state executive organs in charge of enforcing federal and state laws, respectively (Assefa, 2007).

Based on this, one may argue that states in Ethiopia are acknowledged as far as the responsibility to execute and administer federally legislated policies and laws are not given to them from the principle. The reality is however, due to infant stage of federal-states intergovernmental relations, state machinery directly executes federal laws and the state governments take over the responsibility of enforcing and administering

federal laws and policies regardless of the absence of this mandate. Here, in the absence of well-organized institutional set-up for the enforcement of federal laws in states, the federal government uses system of federal-states intergovernmental relations through informal contacts between the respective offices and party channels.

However, there are some⁵⁵ federal executive organs organized throughout the states to enforce federal laws, practice indicates that there is a gap in enforcing all other federal laws. As far as other areas are concerned, as mentioned earlier the federal government has not organized institutions to enforce its laws, states implement without any authorization because of informal based federal-state intergovernmental relations exist; that hinders their executive autonomy constitutionally given. In addition to their task of implementing, administering and executing their own laws and policies, states involved themselves in the task of implementing and administering exclusive federal powers.

According to Article 55, the federal government shall have exclusive power to legislate with respect to 'foreign affairs and defense, citizenship, freedom of movement, passports, immigration, emigration, and extradition; currency, money and coinage, weight and measures and the determination of standards of time; air transport; federal rail ways; postal and telecommunications services; industrial property rights, copy rights and publishing; statistics; regulation of federal employees'. If it is in accordance of the principle and existing experience system, the federal government is expected to have its institution in states for implementation of policies and laws in these mentioned areas. Again, the reality is except in some that are mentioned earlier, the federal government has no institutions in states. Here more than affecting the autonomy of states, this situation creates difficulty even for the citizens of the country as a whole. For instance, one can mention the issue of passports (Assefa, 2007) which requires every people to come to the capital city of the country, Addis Ababa from each corner of the country since there is no established institution for this exclusive federal power implementation in states.

Although the constitution does not provide comprehensive regime of concurrent powers except tax⁵⁶, it can be said that according to art-51 and 52, the bulk of social, education, economic and health affairs are

⁵⁵ The federal government maintains federal institutions only in a few areas of exclusive federal matters such as Telecommunications, Postal Services, Federal Public Prosecution, Federal Inland Revenue and Insurance and Banking

⁵⁶ The FDRE constitution recognizes tax as concurrent power. Except this, there is no explicitly recognized concurrent power of both federal and states by the constitution. See Aalen, 'Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience' 1991-2000, Bergen: Chr. Michelse, Institut Development Studies and Human Rights, 2002 at 89, Assefa Fiseha, 'Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia, A comparative Study', Wolf Legal Publishers, the Netherlands 2007 at 356. See also Article 97 of FDRE constitution.

⁵⁴ FDRE Constitution, Article 50(2) 1

shared between the federal government and the states. However, there are no institutionalized meetings, for instance, between respective heads of health, education and agriculture, of the federal government and the states for the execution and administration of policies and laws. There is no institution of federal government for implementation of policies and laws of these areas in states too. The reality is that due to close, infant stage and informal federal-states intergovernmental relations, states participate in administration of these policies through their respective sectors. Ethiopian academic scholar, Assefa concluded this situation as 'There is neither a comprehensive dual structure nor executive federalism at work. The institution of co-operative federalism too is not well-known' (Assefa, 2007).

From this study point of view, the earlier mentioned statement holds true because as far as the constitution is concerned, it is dual federalism (Article-50(2)) and it does not give a mandate of implementing federal laws to states unlike Swiss constitution (Art. 46 (1)) and Germany (Article 83 of the Basic Law). But as far as practice is concerned, it shows that as it discussed, enforcement of federal laws and policies in the states is undertaken by informal contacts between the respective offices and party channels which affects autonomy of states from this eye. Thus, in Ethiopia, the constitution has tried to set a dual system of division of executive power, in practice there is no proper observance. There is a gap to put in practice this constitutional ambition and the federal government uses federal-states relations as mechanism for implementation of its policies and laws in states.

As stated in previous section, one mechanism in which federal-state intergovernmental relations is influencing state autonomy is through the extensive cooperation that state shows towards the federal government and its executive institution, literally. Bringing this argument to state executive autonomy, more than other things, some of the state constitutions itself stipulate that 'without prejudice to the provision of the federal constitution, the state executive shall have the power and function to ensure the implementation of laws and decisions issued by the state council and *the federal government*'.⁵⁷ For instance, Article 55 of Oromia regional state constitution stipulates for direct enforces of laws of the federal government even if there is neither express delegation nor any federal body at state.

Before closing this discussion, there is current new evidence of unconstitutional practices that influences executive autonomy of states of land administration as it is discussed earlier. According to the constitution, the federal government has the power of adopting rules and regulations while states have a mandate of execution and administration of land. However, according to urban lands

lease holding proclamation No. 721/2011, Article 32 gives federal executive institution, Ministry of urban development and construction, the power to prepare regulations and directives of land lease holding administration. There are regulations and directives adopted by this federal executive institution and implemented and administered by states and both city administrations, vested with the power to administer land. For instance, urban land administration through lease established by urban land development and management bureau of ministry of urban development and construction that the states are administering now can be mentioned.⁵⁸ This and other regulations, manuals and operations continues to be established in the future by this federal executive institution on one hand and states and city administration will also continue their administration and execution of what is established unless that proclamation is repealed by other proclamation.

Generally, it can be argued that as far as the constitution, the system and principle is concerned states of Ethiopia has no mandate and responsibility to implement or execute and administer both exclusive federal power in their jurisdiction because there has to be federal institution in states that do this business. Additionally, states have no mandate of implementing and administering regulations established by the federal executive institutions. In reality however, states are doing this because of informal based and infant stage federal-state intergovernmental relations.

Conclusion

This study is aimed to analysis impact of federal-states intergovernmental relations on states autonomy of Ethiopian federation. Like some other federations, Ethiopia was under centralized unitary system that later brings establishment of federal system. It is identified that power is divided between federal and states governments with less regulated intergovernmental relations provisions. It affirmed that organization of regional affairs established as institution for federal-states intergovernmental relation later devolved to Ministry of Federal affairs through proclamation in 2001. The mandate of enhancing effective and coordinate federal-states intergovernmental relation is given to it as

⁵⁷ Some state constitutions intentionally give the mandate of enforcing federal laws by state executive institutions which the federal constitution doesn't mandate. For instance, Art. 55 of Oromia regional state; Art. 58 of Amhara regional state and Art. 56 of Tigray regional state cited in Ibid at 356

⁵⁸ According to this document, corruption as well as existence of gaps among states in administration of land needed to establish plans, strategy and regulations by this federal executive institution. See document established for the 'Administration of Urban Land through Lease', December 2013, Addis Ababa: Urban Land Development and Management Bureau: Ministry of Urban Development and Construction. Here, the constitutionally given land administration given to states by the constitution is given to federal government executive institution by this proclamation. Some writer criticizes this as upward delegation which the constitution does not allow in Ethiopian case. Assefa Fiseha, 'Ethiopia's Experiment in Accommodating Diversity'; A Twenty Years Balance Sheet; *Ethiopian Journal of Federal Studies*; Centre for Federal Studies; The Addis Ababa University Press, Vol.1, No.1, 2013 at 121

institution of intergovernmental relation. However, its effectiveness towards this mandate is not viable due to discussed reasons, if not limited to some state. Practically, there is no institution of federal-states intergovernmental relations.

Under Ethiopian federal-states relation the issue of autonomy is also analyzed. Thus, intergovernmental relations are informal and party channel which leads to federal government and its executive institution domination. Federal executive institution such as Ministerial and agency relation to respective states bureau and agencies, party channel relation, informal relation through conferences and workshops organized by federal alone characterizes Ethiopian current intergovernmental relations. This clearly stated the fact that federal-states relations organized by federal executive institution and party channel have influence on the latter's autonomy which was a major journey of this thesis. To validate this argument, how legislative and executive autonomy of states are influenced because of both orders intergovernmental relations is discussed. In practice, states executive organs implement as well as administer exclusive federal powers without expressed delegation and authorization due to informal as well as infant stage federal-state intergovernmental relations. Thus, this showed us that federal-states intergovernmental relation which is more informal through party channel, excessive cooperation of states towards federal government and infant stage influences state autonomy.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

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